

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

OCTOBER, 1974

THE SOVIET UNION, 1974

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Current History

OCTOBER, 1974

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What are the latest developments in the fields of Soviet politics, the society, the economy? What is the influence of the military? What of the superpower quest for détente? In this issue, seven articles explore these and other problems in the Soviet Union today. Our introductory article points out that: "It seems difficult to generate a sustained, informative, dispassionate discussion about détente because of the inability or unwillingness of leading spokesmen to separate considerations of its costs and benefits from United States domestic politics and partisan propensities."

Soviet-American Relations

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

THE HALTING IMPROVEMENT in United States-Soviet relations that followed the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, gathered momentum in the late 1960's. A number of factors led the two superpowers to search for an accommodation: the escalating costs of modern weapons systems and the consequent wish to slow down and stabilize the strategic (nuclear) arms race; the mutual desire to normalize relations in Europe, in response to pressures from alliance partners; the emerging prominence of the "China factor" in foreign policy calculations (an intriguing prospect for Washington, but a serious problem for Moscow); mounting economic problems that increasingly led Soviet leaders to seek technology and credits in the West; and the imperial fatigue of the United States, epitomized by the "Nixon Doctrine," with its promise of reduced American commitments abroad, and by the growing American absorption with domestic problems.

There were setbacks to the superpower quest for détente. In particular, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, and Moscow's provocative behavior during the October, 1973, Middle East war revived anxieties in the West about the character of Soviet intentions. But so intense have been the pressures for détente that, inexorably and perhaps too hastily, residual tensions and threats have been minimized. Thus, the "Brezhnev Doctrine" (Moscow's blank check for intervention anywhere in the "socialist world") was conveniently given local significance only, and the strategic lessons of the October, 1973,

war seem to have had no discernible effect on Western military and economic policies.

The exchange of visits between President Richard Nixon and Soviet Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev in 1972, 1973, and 1974 gave impetus to the policy of détente. In May, 1972, at the Moscow summit meeting, the United States and the Soviet Union took their first small step toward a limitation on strategic weapons. SALT I consisted of two agreements: a treaty limiting each country to 200 ABM's (anti-ballistic missiles) for the defense of their respective capitals and of one offensive missile site at least 800 miles away; and a five-year executive agreement limiting the number of offensive land-based and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. (Medium and short-range missiles, which the Soviets have deployed in large numbers in Europe and along the Chinese border, were not included.)

These were small but promising first steps toward the curtailment of the arms race. At the Washington summit conference, in June, 1973, the two leaders signed a number of agreements, though none were of any military significance. The agreements were designed to improve the overall negotiating environment and to broaden economic, technological, and scientific exchanges.

In June, 1974, at the Moscow summit conference, a comprehensive accord on offensive weapons proved unattainable. Several modest steps were taken. First, in addition to the 1963 ban on nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, the two

countries agreed "not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons" (the equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT), beginning March 31, 1976. This treaty is intended to remain in effect for five years and is open to successive renewals for similar periods. Second, they agreed to limit themselves to one ABM system instead of the two negotiated in 1972. Thus, both sides seemed willing to forego the costly and potentially strategically destabilizing development of a massive ABM system.

What was negotiated was far less significant than what was not; namely, the inability to curb qualitative improvements in missiles or to limit the deployment of multiple warheads on missiles (known as MIRV-ing). The military-technological race was hardly slowed down by the 1974 agreements. Neither government even raised the possibility of calling a moratorium on all long-range missile testing—the only step that could promptly and safely slow down the testing and deployment of new strategic weapons systems.

The Nixon-Brezhnev communiqué also touched on various problems pertaining to the Middle East, Europe, and economic relations. A solution to these is a prerequisite for détente, although the strategic arms issue received greater attention. The Middle East may yet turn out to be the main testing ground for détente.

THE OCTOBER WAR

In Moscow, on May 29, 1972, President Nixon and Secretary General Brezhnev signed a document entitled, "Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." This document pledged both countries to avoid military confrontations and to consult with each other in the event of serious international tension. The fourth Arab-Israeli war, which erupted on October 6, 1973, showed the hollowness of these pledges and set in motion a chain of developments that almost produced a showdown in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union knew the war was coming, at least several days before, but did nothing directly to alert the United States. Once the fighting began, Moscow reprovisioned the Arabs and refused to cooperate with the United States, either bilaterally or in the United Nations, to stop the fighting. Moscow gambled on its Arab clients, even at the risk of undermining the fragile structure that it had painstakingly built with Washington in the previous 18 months. It was clearly not concerned with the pledge to consult on threats to international peace.

The massive Soviet resupply of the Arabs threatened to mushroom into a direct superpower confrontation more dangerous than any since the Cuban missile crisis. President Nixon's determination to uphold the long-standing commitments of the United States to

Israel and Israel's recovery on the battlefield persuaded Moscow to temper ambition with caution.

A cease-fire agreement was negotiated between Egypt and Israel in December, 1973, and, five months later, between Syria and Israel. Largely due to the skillful efforts of United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the guns fell silent and the conflict shifted to the conference table. Although still open to speculation, the Soviet role, even as a related peacemaker, appears to have been negligible. Indeed, Moscow is apparently concerned less with the peace that may ultimately emerge than with an assurance that the Soviet Union will be an integral part of the peace-making process.

The Middle East war raised many questions about Soviet ambitions and policy in the area and, even more important, about the meaning of détente. Secretary of State Kissinger laid the problem bare. At a news conference in Washington, on December 27, 1973, he declared:

It is obvious that it is not possible for a country to exacerbate tensions in one area and to seek relaxation in another. This administration has consistently opposed the notion of selective détente in which one area would be pacified while there would be very active conflict in another.

This statement would appear to foreclose close cooperation with the Soviet Union on one major issue while engaging in a bitter competition in another. However, consistency is not a characteristic of international politics.

Besides the diplomatic dimension of détente there is also the military dimension. The quality and diversity of Soviet weaponry used by the Arab armies impressed NATO observers; the Soviet airlift capability came as a stunning surprise, representing a major advance over what was available to the Soviet military in the June, 1967, Middle East war. The sustained expansion of Soviet power in conventional forces has raised deep concern among American military planners about the security of the NATO countries. It has also generated pressure for increasing the United States defense budget to keep abreast of the U.S.S.R. in key types of conventional forces and weapons. The arms race races on. Where, then, does détente fit in?

DEFINITIONAL PITFALLS

The term "détente" has only recently begun to appear in the Soviet press. Hitherto, whenever the Soviet leadership wanted to convey a relatively conciliatory line toward the West, it used the term "peaceful coexistence." To the Soviets, this meant a temporary and tactical acceptance of struggle and competition, short of war, between different social and economic systems. It did not mean compromise on ideological questions:

The bourgeois and Communist world outlooks cannot be reconciled; moreover, this is not necessary for peaceful coexistence among states. . . . The recognition of the necessity and possibility of peaceful coexistence does not signify rejection of the class struggle, of the idea of the inevitability of the victory of communism over capitalism.

Implicit in the concept was continued rivalry, suspicion, and efforts to weaken the adversary through a combination of political, economic, cultural, and ideological means.

"Détente," however—the French word for a relaxation of international tension—carries with it in the English language the connotation of a process of developing extensive, friendly, cooperative relations in all spheres of national interaction. In the United States, in particular, many officials and leaders of public opinion behave as if the mere use of the term has suddenly transmogrified the essence of the Soviet-American relationship. They argue that the cold war is over, that common interests beyond the avoidance of nuclear war transcend any residual conflicts, and that the United States should be understanding of Soviet needs and grant generous concessions in order to strengthen the forces in each society that support a further improvement in relations.

Soviet leaders have recently begun to use the term *détente* in conjunction with calls for peaceful coexistence. For example, on August 15, 1973, in a major speech in Alma-Ata (the capital of Kazakhstan in Soviet Central Asia), Leonid Brezhnev noted:

. . . a whole system of treaties, agreements and understandings has come into being and these lay a foundation for peaceful . . . constructive relations between the socialist and the capitalist countries. All this gives ground for hoping that the present *détente* is not something temporary but is the beginning of a fundamental reorganization of international relations.

Since then, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko has spoken on several occasions of peaceful coexistence and *détente* as appropriate and desirable.

What all this signifies for actual Soviet policy toward concrete issues is far from clear. In the past, Soviet ideology has been highly malleable. Policy shifts occasioned by changes in the international balance of power have been incorporated in refurbished ideological formulations. Thus, in 1956, Premier Nikita Khrushchev, recognizing that nuclear weapons had made war between great powers unacceptable as a means of attaining political-strategic goals, announced, in a major change of doctrine, that war between capitalism (i.e., the United States) and communism (i.e., the Soviet Union) was no longer fatalistically inevitable.

But if Khrushchev dropped the inevitability-of-war thesis from Moscow's doctrinal baggage, he did not cease in his efforts to undermine his opponents and extend Soviet influence abroad; nor did he cooperate

with other powers to alleviate global ills. Brezhnev has followed in Khrushchev's footsteps, without the bluster and doctrinal pretentiousness, but with comparable determination, skill, and readiness to exploit regional tensions and an adversary's weakness.

Does the Soviet leadership see *détente* as a continuation of the cold war by other means? Or is it prepared to establish pragmatic, long-term, stable relationships with other nations in order to adapt international relationships to the revolutions in technology, population growth, resource scarcity, social unrest, and military advances that are transforming the nature of global politics? The experts are divided, and the evidence is ambivalent.

WHAT PRICE DÉTENTE?

American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union is at a crossroads. Clustered around the signposts are two groups with divergent views on how to proceed. The first group, representing the Nixon administration, with strong support from influential bankers and businessmen, urges the immediate expansion of trade and the granting of substantial economic credits to the Soviet Union, in addition to continued attempts to reach agreements on strategic weapons and reduction-in-force levels in Central Europe. Its basic approach is piecemeal pragmatism.

Those who urge this all-out effort to strengthen and broaden the agreements already reached between the United States and U.S.S.R. contend that *détente* is an "irreversible" process for negotiating and stabilizing superpower relationships. With differing emphasis, the several elements making up this group cite the promising achievements to date: 1) the SALT I agreements to limit ABM's and offensive missiles; 2) the convening of two European conferences, one to promote diplomatic and cultural ties, the other to reduce conventional forces in Central Europe; 3) the normalization of the Berlin problem and of relations between East and West Germany; 4) the expanded trade and scientific exchanges; and 5) the apparent willingness of the Soviet Union to work toward a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis.

They argue that the United States should grant the U.S.S.R. most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, to enable it to sell more goods in this country and as a gesture of goodwill; and that the United States should extend large-scale economic credits to help cement political ties, create favorable conditions for cooperation, and maximize United States leverage on Soviet policy, at a time when Moscow needs what the United States has to offer. In general, this group opposes the premise that economic concessions should be linked to Soviet permission for emigration to those of its citizens who desire it, and to the exertion of pressure on the U.S.S.R. to obtain better treatment for Soviet dissidents.

On March 7, 1974, in a statement before the Finance Committee of the United States Senate urging MFN treatment for, and expanded trade relations with, the Soviet Union, Kissinger argued against trying to bring about changes in Soviet society through economic pressure:

To us, détente is a process of managing relations with a potentially hostile country in order to preserve peace while maintaining our vital interests. In a nuclear age, this is in itself an objective not without moral validity—it may indeed be the most profound imperative of all. . . .

Since détente is rooted in a recognition of differences—and based on the prevention of disaster—there are sharp limits to what we can insist upon as part of this relationship. We have a right to demand responsible international behavior from the U.S.S.R. We did not hesitate to make this clear during the Middle East crisis, and in other crisis points. We also have a right to demand that agreements we sign are observed in good faith.

But with respect to basic changes in the Soviet system, the issue is not whether we condone what the U.S.S.R. does internally; it is whether and to what extent we can risk other objectives—and especially the building of a structure for peace—for these domestic changes.

The second group, coalescing generally around the position of Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.), insists that before granting economic benefits concessions be obtained from the Soviet government permitting the free emigration of its citizens. In a speech in March, 1973, Senator Jackson set forth the essentials of his position:

We propose to deny the benefits of our abundant economy—most favored access to our market, credits, credit guarantees, and investment guarantees—to any nonmarket (i.e., Communist) country that denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate or imposes more than nominal taxes on emigration. In so moving we are upholding our traditional commitment to individual liberty—a commitment that was enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights unanimously adopted by the United Nations more than 25 years ago.

At the heart of the Jackson position is a profound distrust of Soviet policies and behavior and a deep-rooted skepticism of détente. The groups supporting Senator Jackson are drawn from the ranks of Congress and labor. They note that the Soviet military build-up has increased, not decreased, in recent years, notwithstanding the SALT agreements of 1972 and 1974. They point to the incendiary role of the Soviet Union during the October, 1973, Middle East war, and believe that the cease-fire agreements there were the result of Kissinger's astute diplomacy and the realism of the Arab leaders (especially Egypt's President Sadat) and not because of any assistance from the Soviet Union. On the contrary, they point to circumstantial evidence suggesting that in the spring of 1974 Moscow tried a combination of blandishments and blackmail to stiffen the resistance of the

Syrian military to the Kissinger-mediated cease-fire with Israel.

The skeptics of détente see no substantive evidence in Europe of any mellowing in Moscow. They contend that the post-1972 Berlin agreements are largely cosmetic and have brought little real relaxation in day-to-day relations between East and West Germany. Soviet conventional forces in Central Europe are continually being strengthened: they now outnumber NATO's forces and are superior in every category of weaponry. Moscow's position on cultural and information exchanges shows little change. In Moscow itself, American officials remain as isolated as ever from Soviet life. Soviet citizens trying to make contact with American officials or even to enter the American Embassy are harassed and interrogated.

Wherein lies the détente? In the view of this group, only when it comes to managing summit meetings or obtaining Western technology and credits at bargain rates does Moscow turn on the charm.

The Jackson coalition fears that the United States, in its absorption with reaching agreements with the Soviets on strategic weapons, may seriously undermine its vital political relationship with West Europe. Certainly nuclear weapons are a threat to all nations: their use in war might alter society as we know it. But this evil may be with us forever. Practically speaking, our stability and prosperity are tied to those of West Europe. Yet NATO, when compared to the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, is divided and weak in conventional forces. And United States relations with its NATO allies (and Japan) are beset by innumerable ills, largely avoidable, which demand at least the degree of attention being lavished on the U.S.S.R.

PITFALLS

Détente with the Soviet Union poses a complex problem. The implications for American and for Soviet foreign policy are far-reaching. It seems difficult to generate a sustained, informative, dispassionate discussion about détente because of the inability or unwillingness of leading spokesmen to separate consideration of its costs and benefits from United States domestic politics and partisan propensities. Yet this separation is essential.

Historically (in the past 40 years or so), those who have had very little to do with Soviet affairs have made the most ingenuous and alarming comments about Soviet-American prospects. For example, in early May, 1974, Arthur F. Burns, a top economic adviser to President Nixon and chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, visited the Soviet Union to discuss a wide variety of economic and political topics with Soviet officials. In an interview in Moscow, Burns stated: "In the six to seven days that I've spent in the Soviet Union, not one Russian government

official or economist even mentioned Karl Marx."

Burns presumably wanted to convey the idea that Soviet officials were not influenced by ideology, but were practical people, interested in doing business with the United States. However, this comment is dangerously misleading, if it is intended to show that Soviet officials are similar to their American counterparts in what they want, in how they function, and in what they represent.

Those magnates of American business who are most eager to do business with the Soviet Union insist that the United States government negotiate economically profitable business ventures, whose utility for the United States is debatable, and provide financial guarantees against loss. Experience has shown that, when it comes to dealing with the Soviet Union, most American corporation executives are babes-in-the-woods who expect Uncle Sam to rescue them when the Russian Bear turns nasty.

At a time when interest rates are at record highs, the United States Export-Import Bank has extended more than \$500 million in credits to the Soviet Union at about six percent interest: the United States government in effect, is subsidizing Soviet purchases in this country. In the months ahead, Congress may act to tighten the conditions under which credits are given the U.S.S.R.

Prominent Soviet dissidents also caution the West against pursuing détente without Soviet concessions leading to a liberalization of Soviet society. In an interview on August 21, 1973, the fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Andrei D. Sakharov, the "father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb" and a leading force in the Soviet human rights movement, told a group of Western journalists:

Détente without democratization, détente in which the West in effect accepts the Soviet rules of the game, would be dangerous. It would not really solve any of the world's problems and would simply mean capitulating in the face of real or exaggerated Soviet power. It would mean trading with the Soviet Union, buying its gas and oil, while ignoring all other aspects.

I think such a development would be dangerous because it would contaminate the whole world with the anti-democratic peculiarities of Soviet society; it would enable the Soviet Union to by-pass problems it cannot resolve on its own and to concentrate on accumulating still further strength. . . . I think that if détente were to proceed totally without qualifications, on Soviet terms, it would pose a serious threat to the world as a whole.¹

Ironically, détente may not promote the democratization of Soviet society sought by Sakharov and others, but may actually strengthen the position of the Communist party and the wary autocrats who rule the Soviet Union.

Soviet leaders have made it clear time and again

that they have no intention of allowing a free exchange of ideas and peoples. Détente for them means the importation of technology and machinery. It enables them to shore up their troubled economy without having to make any fundamental changes in the existing system. Any meaningful internal liberalization that threatened the monopoly position of the Communist party would produce an immediate crackdown, a tightening of controls. Even during these relatively relaxed times, Western businessmen and journalists in the U.S.S.R. are virtual prisoners, visitors restricted to the showplaces of the U.S.S.R. Few ever have real contact with any of the average Soviet citizens.

OBSERVATIONS

Thus far, the fruits of détente for the Soviet Union are easy to identify; for the United States, the consequences are less obvious.

In recent years, the Soviet leadership can congratulate itself on the following achievements, deriving from the decision, which was probably approved finally at the twenty-fourth congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in March, 1971, to pursue détente with the United States: 1) obtaining the West's formal acceptance of the territorial status quo in Europe; 2) closing the gap in strategic weapons and delivery systems and approaching "real parity" with the United States; 3) contributing to the crisis of credibility that is afflicting NATO and generating divisive tendencies within the Atlantic community; 4) inducing the United States to go slow in its courtship of China by holding out the prospect of a "conceptual breakthrough" in arms control; 5) receiving extensive credits and advanced technology from the United States, Japan, and West Germany; 6) effectively compartmentalizing cooperation, thus negotiating agreements in areas of interest to Moscow, while forestalling agreements in areas (e.g., the Middle East) where conflict and competition are deemed in Moscow's national interest; and 7) strengthening the hand of those in the West who push for unilateral reductions of conventional forces, while at the same time proceeding

(Continued on page 181.)

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, one of *Current History's* contributing editors, is author of a number of books including *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, 3d edition (New York: Random House, 1972), and *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), and is editor of *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World* (New York: Praeger Publishers, forthcoming in early 1975). During the 1974-1975 academic year, he is a Visiting Fellow at Cambridge University, England.

¹ *The New York Times Magazine*, November 4, 1973.

"SALT II and MFR agreements should not be sacrificed for elusive, if desirable, goals like the alteration of the political system of the Soviet Union. To accept that goal, perhaps even in terms of 'freer movement of peoples and ideas,' is to regress toward the cold war and toward an incalculably more dangerous world."

The Soviet Union and Arms Control

BY LAWRENCE T. CALDWELL

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PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON returned home from his Moscow summit in July, 1973, with no more than symbolic agreements on strategic arms—a decision to refrain from emplacing the second antiballistic missile (ABM) site permitted in the 1972 SALT* I treaty and an agreement to prohibit underground nuclear tests above a 150-kiloton yield. These meager results were certainly disappointing, but the tone of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's message as he traveled through Europe after the summit seemed ominous. He called for a full-scale debate on United States strategic doctrine like that of the late 1950's, when his own book, *Necessity of Choice*, played a major role in crystallizing United States strategy. Undoubtedly the administration anticipated difficulty within the government in controlling the pace of United States weapons development and in modulating that development to the rhythm of its negotiations with the Soviets. The possibility that pressure for new weapons might build at a pace that President Nixon and Kissinger could not control jeopardized their entire détente policy.

The issue was simple enough on the surface. Having failed to break the SALT II deadlock in their respective trips to Moscow during the spring and summer, Kissinger and the President anticipated continued tough bargaining with the Soviets for the remainder of the year. But two developments threatened their ability to control the pace of United States strategic programs: in January, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger had announced a modification of United States intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) targeting policy that signaled an important change in strategic doctrine, and in February the Soviets conducted a vigorous series of tests on four new missile systems—the SS-X-16, SS-X-17, SS-X-18 and SS-X-19. The former development had caused con-

cern in Soviet defense circles and had possibly given those in Moscow with reservations about the détente/SALT nexus grounds for bringing the Brezhnev policy into question. The latter development had broadened opposition to the Nixon administration's policy of negotiating arms reductions by convincing a number of defense specialists that the Soviet Union was actually determined to achieve the superiority that hardliners like Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.) had always claimed SALT I had permitted.

But just below these hardware questions lay political issues of far greater consequence. What is the purpose of United States strategic doctrine and its derivative military forces? And how do these find justification in a world of détente? It was these broader issues which evidently lay behind Kissinger's admonition that the debate for which he called not be focused, as had much of the previous discussion, on sterile numbers, on comparisons of how many missiles and warheads the two sides possess. But this plea not to focus the debate on numbers revealed more than the Secretary of State's intellectual preference; it also suggested his probable bias that the concepts of strategic "parity" and nuclear "sufficiency" would have to be understood in less precise arithmetic formulae than had thus far been demanded by opponents of administration policy.

The whole trouble with Senator Jackson's demand that SALT I be repaired to provide for numerical equivalency was, from the perspective of the Nixon/Kissinger policy, the fact that the Soviets needed numerical advantage to offset technological disadvantage. Even as the qualitative American edge, particularly in multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), appeared likely to erode with the new Soviet missile tests, American technology remained superior in submarine-launched ballistic missile technology (SLBM's) and in both intercontinental and "perimeter" aircraft (Europe-based or "forward" based systems—FBS). The strategic balance does not

* Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

admit of quantitative equivalencies precisely because of the difficulty of calculating qualitative factors.

Nowhere are these issues more poignantly focused than in Europe. It was there that French President Charles de Gaulle first asked what consequences followed in international politics from a strategic balance in which the United States mainland could be threatened by Soviet missiles. He withdrew France from NATO in part because his answer to that question seemed to devalue the United States deterrent. It was in Europe that West German Chancellor Willy Brandt first broke through the cold war political stalemate with his Ostpolitik. And it was in Europe that Nixon and Kissinger have received their most serious diplomatic setbacks in the age of bilateral détente. Europe has clearly been the focal point of diplomatic drama during the past 10 years. It is also the area where the tensions of the past 30 years have been most exposed, and where détente must be given content, if it is to have any.

But neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has a very deep sense of security about its position in Europe. Each is, in a sense, an outsider, despite centuries of intimate historical relationship. The United States has deep economic grievances, and faces the prospect of long-term trade rivalry with its military allies. It has reason to be nervous about the economic and political cohesion of the Common Market Nine, although its official policy has promoted the evolution of a strong and independent Europe since the early Marshall Plan days. The Soviet Union has apprehensions that the evolution of West European integration might develop into a "closed political-economic grouping" and even that some kind of military power might emerge, based on the atomic power of Britain and France and the conventional power of the West German Federal Republic. Both powers have evidenced nervousness about the fast pace of political change in West Europe in the winter and spring of 1974, when American relations with Europe seemed to reach a new low, after the unseemly scramble for Middle Eastern oil.

But underlying these political and economic problems is a military dilemma that is deceptively simple.

If the United States does accept strategic parity with the U.S.S.R., of what value is its guarantee to protect West Europe from invasion and diplomatic blackmail by the umbrella of its deterrent force? Can the forces used to maintain strategic parity with the Soviet Union be credibly extended to deter Soviet attack or political pressure against American allies in Europe? Is such an umbrella even needed in the world of détente? And, if it is needed, how much is the umbrella worth, and who should pay what portion of its cost?

Thus the first set of questions—about strategic parity between the U.S.S.R. and the United States—triggers a second range of questions about security in Europe. Both sets of questions form the substance of an overlapping set of negotiations. SALT II is the primary forum in which the bipolar strategic balance is being negotiated. But the possibility of strategic parity raises logically the question of deterrence in Europe, and that question leads to questions about the balance of conventional forces, the focus of the mutual force reduction talks (MFR) in Vienna. And both these negotiations require basic judgments about the political bases of détente, judgments which are, in an ironic way, more exposed in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) than in either of the other two. Through the media of these three sets of negotiations, then, the very bases of NATO and Western defense policy and the assumptions behind détente have been brought sharply into question during the past 12 months.

SALT II: THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

The Interim Agreement, which resulted from the first phase of SALT and which was signed by President Nixon in his 1972 summit conference with Brezhnev in Moscow, provided for some numerical imbalance in the strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union.¹ It permitted the Soviets to emplace 1,618 ICBM's and 950 SLBM's, while the United States was permitted 1,000 ICBM's and 710 SLBM's. The numerical discrepancy provided the momentum behind Senator Jackson's reservations concerning the treaty and his efforts to get a commitment to numerical equality in the final, or SALT II, accord.² But quantitative "inferiority" had been accepted by the American negotiators, and by both the President and Kissinger, precisely because they understood the United States to have several *qualitative* advantages.

First, it was conceived that the United States was several years ahead of the Soviets in the development of MIRV, and thus, the United States had already adopted a program to deploy a limited number of MIRV warheads. Second, the United States retained a numerical lead of around 500 to 150 in intercontinental bombers, and the payloads of the B-52's considerably exceeded those of a single missile. Third,

¹ The 1972 Interim Agreement, Protocol and ABM Treaty are found in: *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Department of State* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), vol. 23, part 4, pp. 3462-3482. An excellent summary of the data is found in *Annual Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), pp. 1-2.

² The Senate voted for the joint resolution, approving the Interim Agreement by a vote of 88 to 2 on September 14, 1972, after accepting an amendment that same day (56 to 35) by Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.), which restricted future agreements on ICBM's to "levels" that would not leave the United States in an "inferior" position to the U.S.S.R. *Congressional Record*, September 14, 1972, pp. 514897, 514913.

and in some ways the most perplexing issue to the Americans on the SALT delegation, the United States had forward-based systems (FBS). Although these airplanes based largely in Europe or on the carriers of the Second and Sixth fleets are able to perform in several roles, from the Soviet point of view they might be used in a strategic attack against the U.S.S.R. homeland. The Russians had surprised the Americans early in the SALT discussions by their tenacity in raising and insisting on discussion of the FBS issue.³

The fact was, of course, that the American and Soviet strategic forces were asymmetrical, and precise numerical equivalency could not be determined. The Nixon administration, therefore, signed the Interim Agreement on the assumption that the unfavorable ratio of forces within the agreement was compensated for by the relatively higher technology of the United States MIRV and planes and by favorable ratios in bombers.

Two probably independent, but intimately related, developments in early 1974 renewed the debate in the United States over the assumptions behind the Interim Agreement. First, United States Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced in January that the United States was retargeting some of its strategic forces to a counter-force mode.⁴ His rationale, in defense of which he was joined by the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Fred Ikle, was that retargeting gave the President options, should a war break out, to avoid the cities of an adversary in the hope that by controlling escalation from the United States side the adversary might be induced to practice parallel restraint. Failing that, retargeting gave the United States the ability to "disarm" certain of the opponents' strategic forces, thereby reducing the damage to the American forces and population. This was the familiar counter-force versus counter-value track all over again. One problem with this ostensibly very rational and humane adjustment in strategy is that the targeting system necessary to achieve such a posture is indistinguishable by an

opponent from one which seeks to achieve a disarming "first strike." Predictably, the Soviets protested, and undoubtedly people in the Soviet government with a relatively higher distrust of the United States used the Schlesinger adjustment of strategy as proof that the United States was seeking unilateral and dangerous strategic advantages.⁵

The second set of developments that threatened the assumptions of the Interim Agreement originated in the Soviet Union. In February, 1974, timed to coincide with the reopening after a recess of SALT II negotiations in Geneva, the Soviets tested four new missiles, three of them with multiple warheads. Since a large part of the rationale for accepting numerical inferiority in 1972 consisted precisely in the supposed United States MIRV lead, this was a disquieting sign even to some analysts who had reluctantly gone along with the earlier agreements. The SS-X-17 was tested with four warheads and the SS-X-19 with six.⁶ These were apparently competitive models to replace the SS-11, the workhorse ICBM of the Soviet force. These missiles did not yet possess the "silo-killer" capability, but the gigantic SS-X-18, a successor to the SS-9, could launch five re-entry vehicles (RV's) with warheads in excess of a two-megaton yield, possibly as high as five megatons. That would, according to the Secretary of Defense, give the Soviets a probable hard-target kill capacity.⁷ To be able to destroy even reinforced Minuteman silos, or a large part of them, it was argued, might tempt the Soviets to attempt a "first strike." Since the Interim Agreement permits the Soviets 313 "heavy" ICBM's, the MIRV-ed SS-X-18 might give them as many as 1,565 silo-killer warheads against 1,000 Minuteman missiles.⁸ Thus, it was possible to argue that the Soviet demonstration of multiple warhead technology in February and March, 1973, threatened to undercut the calculations on which SALT I had been brought to a conclusion.

This concern prompted the Kissinger visit to Moscow in March. He made it clear that his objective was to achieve a "conceptual breakthrough" that would dissolve the deadlock in SALT II and pave the way for the President's June conference. Although the exact details of the proposals Kissinger discussed in the Kremlin are not known, it is clear that he proposed that the strategic balance between the two sides be calculated in terms of "throw-weight." This is a deceptively simple concept meaning that in calculating the strategic balance, not numbers of missiles, but the weight of the warheads the missiles could lift (or rocket thrust) would be used. This would help the United States solve its problem—the size of the SS-9 and SS-X-18 rocket motors, but is unlikely to address the most serious problem from a Soviet perspective—the United States technological advantages in MIRV and in warhead miniaturization. The

³ See John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 174–176.

⁴ See his speech to the Overseas Writers' Club on January 10, in *The New York Times*, January 11, which elaborated the January 10 statement; *ibid.*, January 25, 1974, p. 5.

⁵ See, for example, articles by A. Platonov and L. Alekseyev, *Pravda*, February 14, 1974, p. 4; and by V. Larionov, *Pravda*, April 7, 1974, p. 4. The latter writer, a colonel in the Soviet army, has long been an important commentator on strategic affairs.

⁶ James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 45–46.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ The details are not in the signed documents of the 1972 Moscow summit, but see Henry Kissinger's news conference in Kiev, May 29, 1972, as reported in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 5, 1972, p. 960.

Americans have thus far failed to persuade the Russians to accept the "throw-weight" standard for equivalency.

Two sets of independent technical developments, then, cast the whole bilateral arms negotiations under suspicion. Both these developments threatened to erode the stability of a second-strike environment, since each could be interpreted by the other side as an attempt to get a first-strike capability. It has long been assumed in defense circles that a secure second-strike capability guaranteed deterrence and lowered the chance of nuclear war. The retargeting policy and the missile tests were intimately related also by their impact within the Soviet Union and the United States. In both cases, the technical development of the other side was used as a means by which dissatisfied forces could bring into question the Brezhnev and Nixon policies of arms control in particular and détente in general.

Neither of these technical developments that threaten the momentum of strategic arms negotiations and détente itself is open to easy resolution. The doctrinal shift on the United States side runs directly counter to most Soviet doctrine. Moscow has opposed "humanizing" nuclear war and has somewhat blindly refused to think about the unthinkable with an aim of moderating the possible effects of war should deterrence break down.⁹ In this respect, it should be noted that the Soviets have been more willing to consider options below all-out war in terms of their war-fighting capability than they have in their doctrine. Perhaps they fear that any doctrinal modification would dilute the deterrent effect of their nuclear force.

The change in the strategic environment, signaled by the testing of multiple warheads on the Soviet side, is potentially even more destabilizing because it is more visible, and therefore dramatic, and because it fits the past pattern—where both sides have responded to technological developments with technological improvements of their own. This author has seen some wild representations of the new Soviet capability, including one estimate that the Soviets might achieve 23,000 warheads by the end of the decade. While anything may be theoretically possible, such inflated projections depend on the assumption that the Soviet Union will acquire MIRV capabilities not even tested to date and that there will be changes both in its capability and in its will to produce warheads much smaller than those yet used on any of

its missiles. More responsible observers see the Soviets acquiring 7,000 warheads by the end of the decade, based on the following assumptions: (1) that the Soviets will use the SS-X-18 in all of their "heavy" silos, as allowed in SALT I. To do so will require completion of the 25 super-silos that have been under construction for several years and modifications to the 288 SS-9 silos. That will take some time, but will give them 1,565 warheads (313 missiles), say, within five years. (2) That they will deploy the SS-X-17 as a replacement for the 1,030 SS-11 and SS-13 missiles, adding 4,120 warheads to their total. To do this will also require modifications of silos. (3) That they will maintain some single-warhead missiles, perhaps the equivalent of the 209 current SS-7 and SS-8 missiles. (4) That they will employ the SS-X-17 or 19 in the remaining 66 incomplete silos, adding a maximum of 396 warheads. (5) That they will develop their 950 missiles allowed in the SLBM force without MIRV in the five- to six-year future.

These calculations would give the Soviets 7,240 warheads by the end of this decade, but they could be upset in two ways. First, the Kremlin could go for a MIRV capability on its SLBM force, and, second, it could opt for smaller warheads on the larger missiles, resulting in more warheads per missile. Still, the calculations here do represent something of a sensible, medium-range, "bad case," if not "worst case," projection, and they accord with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's prediction in his annual defense budget message to Congress in March, 1974, of 7,000 Soviet warheads.

At first thought, this potential increase in the Soviet capability from its current "allowable" total, assuming single warheads, of 2,568 warheads to 7,240, might seem destabilizing and alarming, particularly given the calculation of 1,565 silo-killer warheads aboard the SS-X-18. But the fact is that the United States will have over 7,000 warheads by the end of 1976. By the end of 1975, the United States will have 550 of its 1,000 ICBM's fitted with three warheads each, giving it 2,100 land-based re-entry vehicles (RV's). In addition, by 1976 it will have 31 Poseidon submarines, each with 16 missiles and with at least 10 warheads on each missile. When added to the Polaris A3, even assuming that all these missiles have single RV's, the Poseidon force will give the United States at least 5,120 warheads in its sea-based deterrent force.

Of course, from the Soviet point of view, the missile developments of 1974 were a response to the United States MIRV program. And the issue squarely before the United States Congress and people in 1974 and 1975 is whether they are willing to live in a strategic environment in which "parity" is defined in terms of approximately 7,000 RV's for each side. Each side has some hedges in this bilateral balance. The U.S.S.R. has larger missiles, with greater thrust, hence

⁹ For an excellent discussion of Soviet attitudes on the relationship between deterrence and tactical nuclear war, see Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 174-176; Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 211-214; and Trevor Cliffe, *Military Technology and the European Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), Adelphi Paper no. 89, pp. 31-34.

greater "throw-weight" and the potential of adding more warheads. It also may develop a MRV or MIRV for its SLBM force. The United States has more of its capability at sea, hence it is less vulnerable; it has more bombers, which are not included in these calculations; and has FBS in Europe and around the periphery of the U.S.S.R. These "hedges" against the balance, as it will stand in the short-range future, of course, also constitute the cutting edge of the arguments in Moscow and Washington for people who have relatively greater suspicion of the other side's intentions. By pointing to the other side's hedges they call for new programs to offset them. That is the stuff of which the arms race is made. Naturally, if either side adopts measures to go beyond the potentially stable 7,000 RV environment, the other will as well, and we will spin through the next twist of the spiral.

But suppose, somewhat optimistically in the light of past performance, that each side does exercise restraint and settles on a 7,000 RV balance. The implications even of that bilateral relationship are potentially very destabilizing in a multilateral framework like that of Europe.

MFR: THE MULTILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

The issue of what strategic parity means for the credibility of the United States deterrent in Europe has affected United States-European policy since the early 1960's. But, arguably, throughout the whole of this period, the strategic relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. has had significant advantages for the United States. Furthermore, these advantages have been visible to all parties. The deterrent umbrella of the United States that constituted the cornerstone of its European policy was based on American technological and numerical superiority in strategic weapons to offset supposed NATO numerical inferiorities in conventional forces and in IRBM/MRBM forces. Therefore, as the United States and the Soviet Union have moved toward a more genuine strategic parity, concern has grown in some quarters of NATO regarding the credibility of the United States umbrella.

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger drew the logical conclusions in his annual defense message to Congress, when he pointed out that "deterrence will be strongly reinforced if there is a balance of conventional as well as of nuclear forces."¹⁰ Although that probably is an agreed goal among defense specialists inside and outside the government in the United States, there is even less agreement on what constitutes balance in this arena than there is in the strategic one.

¹⁰ Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

¹¹ See Leslie Gelb's fine summary in *The New York Times*, February 8, 1974, p. 3.

¹² *Ibid.*

Among the NATO allies this disagreement is compounded by the added disagreement over whose responsibility it is to offset Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional capabilities.

In fact, the whole concept of "mutual and *balanced* force reductions" as it was originally proposed by NATO at its Reykjavik Council meeting in June, 1968, was to get the Warsaw Pact to negotiate proportionately larger reductions on its side so that a conventional balance might be established. Furthermore, NATO and the United States conducted their diplomacy in all the negotiations prior to the actual start of talks in Vienna last October in a manner designed to restrict the focus of the force reductions for Central Europe, where the balance was conceived to be most advantageous to the Warsaw Pact and therefore most susceptible to "balanced" or disproportionate reductions. The goal has been to repair the present "imbalance." Although the NATO assumptions about the force balance in Europe have been challenged in the United States, the actual NATO proposals in Vienna in November, 1973, were based on those assumptions and sought to induce proportionately larger Warsaw Pact reductions.¹¹

In fact, the MFR negotiations (formal reference to the word "balanced" was dropped during the Brezhnev/Nixon talks in June, 1973), have been deadlocked on precisely the question of whether the reductions should be greater from the Warsaw Pact side. Shortly after the conference on "mutual reduction of forces and associated measures for Central Europe" got under way on October 30, 1973, in Vienna, NATO and the Soviet Union advanced very different proposals. The NATO proposal called for an initial reduction in United States and Soviet troops of roughly 25,000 and 60,000 men, respectively, and for eventual reductions of approximately 10 percent on the NATO side and 20 percent of Warsaw Pact forces—to a ceiling of about 700,000 troops on each side. The Soviet proposal called for a first-step reduction of 20,000 troops on both sides, to be drawn from all the countries of each alliance, and a 5 percent overall reduction in 1975 followed by a further reduction of 10 percent in 1976.¹² Against the Soviet proposal of

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"... the Brezhnevian pattern of social control has concealed and abetted a very real immobilism ... in Soviet society. A heavy price may be exacted in the future for the absence of more radical and more effective solutions to persistent general problems. . . . If the Soviet Union emerges, perhaps by default, as the world's greatest superpower, this will have a decisive impact on domestic stabilization, and Brezhnev's conservative leadership will be largely vindicated."

Soviet Politics: Stability or Immobilism?

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THE SOVIET UNION in 1974 presents a superficially striking contrast to many Western democratic regimes with their economic crises and political instability. Of course, domestic politics in the Communist states does not feature the regular successions and alternations of democratic states; however, the continuity of top- and mid-level political leadership in the Soviet Union since 1964 is exceptional, even among the Communist regimes. As of mid-1974, the Soviet political elites seemed to be more cohesive than at any time since the end of the Stalin era. The leadership appears to have contained serious problems of the economy and of dissent and there are indications of a widening "normalization" of Soviet internal politics among important interest groups.

This summary view does not take into account the profound critiques of the Soviet system offered by dissident intellectuals in recent years. Moreover, questions must be raised concerning this apparent stability, even in terms of the regime's own dominant values. Despite significant successes, chronic problems persist. It can be argued that the apparent political stability is not only a mask concealing a fundamental immobilism—the inability to deal realistically and effectively with problems of social change associated with modernization—but is also a major contributing factor to such immobilism. Additionally, if the Soviet political system has indeed succeeded in large measure in achieving domestic stability prior to the attainment of communism, one must ask what are the effects on a regime that is theoretically legitimized by revolutionary ideology. Whatever the degree of political stability actually produced, is it really the result of

the essential abandonment of revolutionary goals? If this is the case, what sort of political order is emerging in the Soviet Union? An examination of the regime's recent record in dealing with major internal problems should provide a basis for tentative answers to these questions.

SUPPRESSION OF DISSENT

The most spectacular action in the Soviet campaign against dissent, which had become increasingly severe during 1972 and 1973, occurred in February, 1974, with the expulsion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn from the Soviet Union and the revocation of his citizenship.¹ After suffering years of petty official harassment and denunciation by the Soviet press, Solzhenitsyn triggered the regime's ultimate response by the publication in Paris on December 28, 1973, of the first volume of *The Gulag Archipelago*, an account of terror in the Stalinist forced labor camps. Translations appeared shortly in other Western languages and the book became an international best seller; the Soviet press responded predictably with violent denunciation of the author.² Press attacks on *August 1914*, his earlier work published abroad, had been almost as vitriolic. Denied permission to publish in the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn had, in fact, been made a celebrated dissenter to the Soviet public by the regime itself because of its crusade against him in official publications. In the light of that degree of internal publicity, the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn was widely regarded in the West as the mildest sanction that could have been imposed without abandonment of the leadership's hard line on dissent.

Solzhenitsyn has been a rather solitary figure. The physicist Andrei Sakharov, on the other hand, has been the central force in the Democratic Movement. Sakharov's prestige, both at home and abroad, has afforded him unusual protection against reprisal in the

¹ *Pravda*, February 14, 1974, p. 6; see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, March 13, 1974, p. 1.

² *Pravda*, January 14, 1974, p. 4, and April 2, 1974, pp. 3-4; *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, no. 3, January 16, 1974, p. 9 and no. 8, February 20, 1974, pp. 14-15.

past, but the move against Solzhenitsyn aroused speculation that Sakharov's limited immunity might be short-lived. In any case, Sakharov himself has increasingly become an isolated protest figure. At the end of 1973, Sakharov's Committee for Human Rights had been virtually demolished by systematic repression, and the loosely knit Democratic Movement appeared to be crushed by the arrests of virtually all important participants.

Notable actions against dissidents since mid-1973 include the "show" trial of Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin in September, 1973, and the re-arrest of historian Andrei Amalrik. Yakir and Krasin, former activists in the underground press (*samizdat*), confessed at their trial and were treated leniently; they have been allowed to live in exile near Moscow. Amalrik completed a three-year term in Siberia in July, 1973, and was sentenced to an additional three years of confinement. The conviction was appealed and, in one of the rare instances of appellate modification in a political case, Amalrik's sentence was commuted to exile.³

Western estimates place the number of political prisoners in the Soviet Union at about 10,000.⁴ Confinement in psychiatric institutions continues to be used as punishment on a selective basis against prominent dissidents; although, in testimony at the Yakir-Krasin trial, existence of this practice was formally denied by Professor Andrei Snezhnevsky, director of the Moscow Institute of General Psychiatry.⁵ Civil rights activists still subjected to this form of punishment as of June, 1974, included Leonid Plyushch, a key member of the Committee for Human Rights during the early 1970's, and Yuri A. Shikmanovich, a former Moscow University mathematician. The most famous of all Soviet political prisoners, former Major-General Pyotr Grigorenko, was released from a mental hospital on June 26, one day prior to United States President Richard M. Nixon's arrival for the summit conference, but this gesture did not mark a general softening of policy; in the week before Nixon's arrival, more than 30 Jewish civil rights activists were arrested in Moscow and other cities.

Despite the severity of the campaign of repression, there were some signs in the winter and spring of 1974 that dissent remains alive in the Soviet Union. Immediately following Solzhenitsyn's arrest, the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko dispatched a telegram of protest to party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. In April, several dozen political prisoners in the labor camps staged a hunger strike to protest the solitary

confinement of the well-known dissident Vladimir Bukovsky. After a lapse of 19 months, in May, 1974, three issues of the *Chronicle of Current Events*, principal *samizdat* publication of the Democratic Movement, appeared.⁶ However, under current conditions, a major revival of the virtually extinct underground press cannot be expected.

Public reaction abroad to Soviet internal repression has been highly unfavorable, but this has had little adverse effect upon important foreign policy initiatives, particularly the continuing détente with the United States. The case of the Kirov Ballet dancers Valery and Galena Panov aroused widespread emotional protest in the West, but the Soviets resolved most of this tension in early June, 1974, by allowing both Panovs to emigrate to Israel. Nevertheless, the Bolshoi Ballet met lively demonstrations on its subsequent tour in Britain. Earlier, the initial Western outrage over Solzhenitsyn's deportation was moderated by an unexpected critical reaction to the author himself. Given the chance to speak freely in the West, Solzhenitsyn revealed himself in interviews as a rather extreme Russian nationalist, generally hostile to Western culture and technology. Additional controversy was provided by publication of his 1973 letter to the Kremlin leadership in which he had outlined his proposals for the future of the Soviet Union, advocating less advanced technology and concentration on the development of a simple society in rural Siberia. Even Sakharov broke with Solzhenitsyn after the letter's publication. In a 3,500-word critique issued in April, Sakharov criticized the "nationalistic and isolationist direction of Solzhenitsyn's thinking and the religious patriarchal romanticism characteristic of him." Further, Sakharov said that Solzhenitsyn's ideas were "authoritarian" and could lead to "the slavish lackey spirit that existed in Russia for centuries."⁷

The present disarray in reformist circles does not mean the end of Soviet dissent. Russia has a long history of producing "superfluous men" among its intelligentsia, and processes of modernization evidently yield a stratum of alienated intellectuals everywhere, regardless of social system. However, for the foreseeable future the Soviet regime appears to have reduced agitation for civil liberties to a minor problem. It has been demonstrated that the kind of dissent propounded by the Democratic Movement, which has questioned the very nature of the Soviet system, can be silenced without undue disorientation of the general pattern of social control. Furthermore, the organizational linkages essential for a broad Soviet protest movement have been effectively destroyed by KGB (Committee of State Security) action and it is unlikely that the reform movement can recover structural viability for some years to come.

When assessing the effects on political stability of the Soviet regime's suppression of dissent, one should

³ Hedrick Smith, "Soviet's Internal Security Eased Since Stalinist Era," *The New York Times*, January 13, 1974, p. 26.

⁴ *The New York Times*, January 13, 1974, p. 1.

⁵ *Tass*, August 30, 1973.

⁶ *The New York Times*, May 19, 1974, p. E3.

⁷ UPI dispatch from Moscow, April 14, 1974.

avoid evaluation exclusively from the perspective of Western experience with political development. "Structural lag"—the tendency for political institutions to change more slowly than the underlying social base—is even more pronounced in the Soviet Union than in Western democratic systems, because of Russian traditions and the structural peculiarities of the Soviet socio-political system, still essentially totalitarian. Moreover, the general level of political sophistication is low by Western standards, even among the intelligentsia. However, Soviet society is highly organized and is the most heavily bureaucratized society in human history.

The interests of most Soviet citizens are articulated through massive bureaucratic structures; the most important aspect of Soviet political stabilization is probably the development of regular processes of conflict resolution among major organized groups and effective "satisfying" in decisional outputs related to their interests. In other words, Soviet politics today is oriented more toward bargaining and interest group activity than toward attempting a revolutionary transformation.

The most impressive features in the record of the Democratic Movement are its inability to make real inroads even among the intelligentsia and its almost total failure to establish linkages with other social strata. This is not entirely a matter of official control of communications and coercive pressures by the regime. Sakharov and his associates have confronted a large measure of political apathy but they have also placed themselves in opposition to the Soviet version of the "politics of consensus."

Most functional specialists in the intelligentsia are attached to the regime by their material interests; they still constitute a privileged elite in Soviet society. The working class has been increasingly tied to the regime, however tenuously, by the approach of the "economism" so repugnant to Lenin in his years of revolutionary struggle—a primary emphasis upon material gains. While still well behind its counterparts in the advanced Western countries, the Soviet working class has made substantial improvement in its standard of living over the last 15 years. The party has largely

succeeded in identifying itself as the champion of the worker's consumption interests against the economic apparatus, which has had much difficulty fulfilling party pledges to the consumer. Even the peasantry appear to have been progressively integrated into the political system, at least in terms of passive compliance. However, the strongest support for the regime comes from the Great Russians. Outside the Russian republic, the "politics of consensus" is rather fragile. The political integration of some of the smaller republics into the general system has been heavily dependent upon the geographical dispersion of the Russians.⁸

Continuation of consensual support for the system, so obscured in the West by the publicity accorded to intellectual dissent, appears to be mainly dependent upon the following: (1) continued success in preventing runaway mass expectations in regard to living standards; (2) further rises in national and per capita income and progress in closing the gap between Soviet and Western living standards; and (3) a reversal of the regime's recent poor record on the integration of subordinate nationalities into the political system.

POLITICS OF NATIONALISM

One of the leadership's chief aims in the campaign against dissent was the breaking of links between the Democratic Movement and nationalist groups. This was accomplished, but it has not prevented the continuing resurgence of nationalism in most of the Soviet borderlands. Brezhnev's close associate, Vladimir Scherbitsky, party boss of the Ukraine, has apparently secured the regime's hold upon that republic for the present, but anti-Soviet nationalism has probably not diminished there among urban intellectuals and among West Ukrainians generally. Azerbaijan⁹ and Georgia continue to be areas of extreme deviance from central goals. Eduard A. Shevardnadze, a tough former police official, was appointed first secretary of the Georgian party in September, 1972, with the express purpose of stamping out nationalism, corruption, and economic inefficiency. He proceeded to carry out a thoroughgoing purge of party and government ranks but encountered extraordinary difficulties, including mass demonstrations in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi in June, 1973, and two attempts on his life. A report by Shevardnadze in *Izvestia*, April, 1974, indicates that his relentless campaign has had little positive effect upon Georgian attitudes and behavior.¹⁰ Despite widespread arrests of nationalists and civil rights leaders in Lithuania during 1972 and 1973, the persistence of strong anti-Soviet nationalism in that Baltic republic is candidly admitted by the authorities.¹¹ One recent indication of Soviet concern about nationalism in border areas is the rather bizarre turnabout in the official interpretation of the historical role of Tamerlane, who has become an important

⁸ See Ivan Dzhuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (New York: Humanities Press, 1968); Edward Allworth (ed.), *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1973); and Hedrick Smith, "Ethnic Russians Are Settled Firmly in Central Asian Lands," *International Herald Tribune*, June 14, 1974, p. 6.

⁹ See speech by G. A. Aliyev, Azerbaijan Party First Secretary, *Bakinsky rabochy*, February 19, 1974, pp. 1-4 (reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, March 27, 1974, pp. 1-5).

¹⁰ *Izvestia*, April 6, 1974, p. 2.

¹¹ See report by V. Khazarov, Lithuanian Party Second Secretary, *Sovetskaya Litva*, November 24, 1973, pp. 1-2 (reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, January 2, 1974, pp. 1-5).

symbol of national identification among the Uzbeks of central Asia.¹²

When critical manifestations of non-Russian nationalism appear, the leadership always concentrates upon the reassertion of central party authority and coercive power; given the underrepresentation of most subordinate nationalities in the party apparatus and membership, this may intensify the long-range problem. Moreover, the effective integration of Soviet nationalities is dependent upon socio-economic factors that are untouched by ideological and coercive campaigns. The official report on plan results for the first quarter of 1974 indicates that the economic gap between the Russian republic and other areas may be widening rather than closing.¹³ Furthermore, although minority nationalities have made advances in absolute terms, the announced plan results conceal a continuing economic disparity between urbanized, more highly educated Russians and indigenous populations in the borderland republics.

One must conclude that nationalities' problems, not the limited intellectual dissent in Soviet cities, at present constitute the weak link in the regime's "politics of consensus."

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

The recovery of the Soviet economy from the downturn of 1971-1972 was certainly most impressive, particularly in the agricultural sector, where output in 1973 increased 14 percent, with a record grain harvest of 222.5 million tons.¹⁴ The general upsurge continued during first quarter 1974, with industrial production reportedly up 8.3 percent over the previous year. An appraisal of the effect of economics on Soviet political stability requires a look at trends obscured by the overall quantitative advance. Most importantly, the economic picture for the working class, the key element in the "politics of consensus," includes certain vulnerabilities.

The Soviet working class has definitely improved its standard of living, but much of its current support for the regime rests on unfulfilled promises. A "consumer revolt" against shoddy goods has been in progress for some years; the waste involved in unsold inventories detracts significantly from capital accumu-

lation, already probably inadequate for future sustained growth. The quantitative production targets for the consumer sector set at the outset of the current five-year plan have had to be revised downward, yet light industry failed to meet its production goals in March, 1974.¹⁵ Brezhnev has indicated that quality of production will be the economic objective of highest priority for the near future¹⁶ and this is indeed essential for the consumerist orientation. But real progress in this area would lower the present high propensity to save, make wage rates more meaningful, and probably increase pressures for incentive rises in wages in all sectors of the economy. In any case, the greater the movement for development of remote regions, the larger will be labor costs relative to output in the short run, given the necessary premium on skilled labor in those areas and the low initial returns.

Soviet experience indicates that the importation of Western technology will not rapidly yield higher productivity and lower unit costs of production. Such projects as Brezhnev's ambitious scheme for opening up the non-black soil regions of the Russian republic (considered necessary for agricultural self-sufficiency)¹⁷ and the economic development of Siberia (essential for meeting the energy requirements of future industrial growth)¹⁸ demand heavy investment at the outset and continuing higher costs of production than presently obtain in the developed areas. Foreign investment will help, but the brunt of the cost must be borne by the Soviet consumer. Whatever the long-range benefits for economic growth and diffusion of national income, in the short run the complex equation involving labor costs, productivity, investment, and output bodes ill for consumptionist policies.

It now appears probable that, by 1980, Nikita Khrushchev's scheduled date for the completion of the foundations of Communist society, the Soviet Union will face an economic situation qualitatively similar to the inflationary crunch experienced by Western capitalist economies in 1973-1974. Rises in real costs of production and demands for goods and services will probably not have been met by a corresponding increase in output, and real per capita income will decline, Soviet living standards not having reached Western levels. If this occurs, the economic basis for the regime's "politics of consensus" will suffer a shattering blow. Such an outcome would be rendered improbable if the economy could approach Western levels of efficiency during this decade. But given the system's apparently low capacity for innovation and adaptation and the political leadership's cautious approach to fundamental economic reform, prospects for such an internal transformation are dim indeed.

In 1973-1974, there was growing Soviet concern with the social problems that have been connected with rapid and uneven modernization in the United

¹² Hedrick Smith, "Tamerlane Embroiled in Soviet Controversy," *The New York Times*, June 2, 1974, p. 2.

¹³ *Pravda*, April 21, 1974, p. 1.

¹⁴ See Report of the Central Statistical Administration, *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, January 26, 1974, pp. 1-3 (reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, February 20, 1974, pp. 14-22).

¹⁵ *Izvestia*, April 23, 1974, p. 4.

¹⁶ See Brezhnev's speech to the 17th Komsomol Congress, *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, April 24, 1974, pp. 1-2 (reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, May 22, 1974, pp. 1-8).

¹⁷ *Izvestia*, March 16, 1974, pp. 1-2.

¹⁸ *Pravda*, February 7, 1974, p. 2, and February 8, 1974, p. 2.

States and other Western countries. In February, 1974, the Supreme Soviet issued a new gun control law, providing five years' imprisonment for unauthorized possession of firearms; this was in response to a rising incidence of crimes of violence, most notably in the southern republics. In May, the Supreme Soviet decreed stiff penalties for the illegal possession or sale of narcotics; this reflected official distress over rising drug abuse among Soviet youth, particularly the use of marijuana and hashish. The official press called for vigilance against the incursion of Western "counter-cultural" influences among Soviet young people, especially in the borderland republics.

Alcoholism, of course, continues to be the greatest single social problem. The sweeping campaign against overconsumption of vodka launched in June, 1972, appears to have had little effect, and alcoholism is so widespread that it may well be the single most important contributor to low labor productivity. A regime spokesman admitted in a February, 1974, article that alcoholism is growing, that it is rising faster among women than among men, and that it can no longer be attributed to bourgeois influences or survivals of Czarist society.¹⁹

While the Soviet Union still ranks far behind the United States in the incidence of overt disorder and symptoms of social disintegration, it is clear that there is a high level of individual alienation that cannot be directly expressed in the political system. A basic reason for this underlying alienation is that Soviet life for most people is both hectic and dull; there are heavy pressures upon the individual and inadequate means for apolitical release of tensions. The leadership recognizes the general problem and has sought to utilize various means to correct it, but the main thrust of the regime's approach has been state sanctions against anti-social conduct and an attempted ideological revitalization of society by the party emphasizing the morality of the "new Soviet man."

Soviet society has obviously lost most of its earlier revolutionary dynamism, both internally and externally. This is by no means an unmitigated disaster for the Soviet system; at the present stage of development, stability of expectations for key functional ele-

ments is more productive for social cohesion and Soviet power than Communist utopianism, which would substitute an undifferentiated social structure for the "new class" developed under socialism. However, given the underlying problems of alienation, the slowness of national integration, and low technical efficiency, the continuation of present levels of achievement is heavily dependent upon a renewed energizing of the central-directive force, the Communist party.

The development of massive and competing bureaucratic structures has given Soviet society an unparalleled technocratic visage; at the same time, it has actually increased party power. As the most pervasive social structure and, theoretically, as the sole bearer of legitimacy in the system, the party is the only agency that can effectively perform the essential "arbitration" function and regulate conflicts among the huge bureaucratic structures.²⁰ As temporary stabilization is secured in various problem areas, dependence upon the party in subsequent decision making appears to grow and its central functional role in the system expands. Moreover, insofar as anomic and reformist deviance threatens the general system of bureaucratic control, the party's role in suppressing dissent gives it additional power over other organized interests.

All of this apparently requires a reassurance of the foundations of party legitimacy, resulting in Brezhnev's campaigns for the re-ideologizing of party and society. There is obvious concern that increased contacts with bourgeois regimes will lead to a diminution of party legitimacy; this concern is reflected in repeated denials of the possibility for "convergence" of social systems²¹ and in the insistence that "peaceful coexistence" policy makes necessary an increase in the intensity of ideological struggle.²²

The ideology has changed to reflect the evolution of Soviet society and the organizational interests of political elites amid the complexities of ongoing processes of modernization. Soviet ideologists now contend that both state and party will increase in strength right up to the inception of communism and that functional specialization will continue into the stage of communism. In other words, Soviet ideology currently provides for the submergence of the "substructure" into the "superstructure," a startling inversion of the original Marxian vision.²³ The concept

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¹⁹ A Sergeyev, "Pursuit of a Monstrous Killer," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, no. 6, February 8, 1974, p. 15.

²⁰ See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration," in Brzezinski (ed.), *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 1-34.

²¹ See Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, Richard Soll, and Annette Stiefbold, *Convergence of Communism and Capitalism: The Soviet View* (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1973), pp. 3-38.

²² See articles by Daniil F. Kraminov, editor of *Za Rubezhom*, in *Pravda*, May 30, 1973, p. 1, and by Vladimir N. Yagodkin, Moscow city party secretary for ideology, *Moskovskaya Pravda*, September 30, 1973, p. 1.

²³ A. Yegorov, "The Party of Scientific Communism," *Kommunist*, no. 2, January, 1973, pp. 36-55.

"Barring unforeseen developments, the Soviet military establishment is unlikely to pose any major challenge to existing political arrangements. Its political participation is confined within reasonably clear limits. . . ."

Civil-Military Relations in Soviet Politics

BY TIMOTHY J. COLTON

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THE SOVIET MILITARY establishment, an impressively solid institution with roots reaching back almost as far as those of the regime itself, is in a state of major transition. The ongoing "revolution in military affairs," as the Soviets term the changes associated with the introduction of nuclear and electronic means of warfare, is entering its third decade with no sign of abatement in the pace of innovation and adaptation in military technology and theory. The Soviet armed forces, as a result of their own steadily expanding capabilities and the regime's global political commitments, are now assigned military tasks unprecedented in their history.

In the last half decade, for the first time, the Soviet military: (1) has attained rough parity in strategic weapons with the United States and has received American acknowledgment of this fact; (2) has evolved a coherent theory of Soviet participation in limited conventional warfare beyond Soviet frontiers, and the beginnings of a theory of participation in limited nuclear conflict; (3) has established a major Soviet naval presence in all the world's oceans; (4) has temporarily equipped a non-bloc ally (Egypt) with an air-defense network manned primarily by Soviet servicemen; (5) has mounted a major resupply effort to non-Communist belligerents in a war (Egypt and Syria); and (6) has been used to threaten direct conventional intervention in a non-contiguous area (Egypt, during the same 1973 war).

Accompanying this has been a continuing turnover in personnel, as a new and technically more sophisticated generation of military leaders takes over from the veterans of earlier wars. The original Civil War command disappeared with the death in 1973 of Semen Budennyi, the last survivor of the five original Soviet marshals and a participant in every Russian

war of this century. The cohort of World War II generals and marshals is also fading from prominence. Nineteen generals of the army or marshals (or equivalents) died between January, 1970, and mid-1974, among them the two most distinguished wartime commanders, Marshals Georgii Zhukov and Ivan Konev. Of the twenty military men elected to the party's Central Committee in April, 1971, six had died or retired by mid-1974. The casualties included such long-time members of the military elite as Marshals Ivan Bagramian, Vasilii Chuikov, and Matvei Zakharov. Only two wartime marshals remain in top defense posts—Andrei Grechko, the Minister of Defense since 1967, now 71 and approaching retirement; and Kirill Moskalenko, 72, a Deputy Minister.

The country's top military official will soon be a man who did not hold a major wartime command. Perhaps the most likely prospect is General of the Army Viktor Kulikov, a surprise appointee as chief of the general staff in 1971, at the age of 50. Another is General of the Army Nikolai Ogarkov, now 57, Kulikov's first deputy and, since the spring of 1974, a deputy defense minister. He is a military engineer with special expertise in nuclear weaponry, and was the military's chief representative at the SALT-I talks where, according to Western observers, he overshadowed the civilian head of the delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semonov. Ogarkov and eight others were appointed to general of the army or equivalent rank in November, 1973; it was the largest mass promotion to that rank level in two decades.

However, in marked contrast to these intra-organizational changes, the military establishment's place in the Soviet political system remains remarkably stable. In an age when military officers are storming presidential palaces in Chile and Portugal, and occupying them in a host of other countries, the Soviet military remains a status quo group under firm civilian control. There has been no redefinition of the relationship between military and civilian institutions. Western reports¹ of greatly increased military influence in Moscow, even of imminent military takeover, are

¹ See, for example, the assertion by Otto Zausmer, associate editor of the *Boston Globe*, that the latest Middle East war "could . . . bring in the military as the dominant power in the Soviet Union." The source of this information is given as "high-ranking diplomats" in Washington and Europe. *Boston Globe*, October 26, 1973, pp. 1, 7.

without firm basis in fact. The Soviet army continues to be, as Marshal A. A. Grechko put it recently, "a reliable bulwark of the party and government."²

A useful device for conceptualizing the Soviet army's participation in politics is to think of it in terms of two dimensions of participation, scope of issues and means employed. In theory, scope can range from purely professional issues bearing directly on the military establishment's function as expert manager of violence, to progressively more general issues having less and less relation to the army's professional function. The means an army uses can range from the provision of expert advice at one extreme, through the use of political bargaining techniques involving exchange of valued services or resources, to the employment of the army's unique political resource—force.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF THE MILITARY

Most of the Soviet military's political participation is strictly confined in both scope and means. The scope of issues with which the army is concerned is mostly professional, and its main means is the tendering of expert advice. Soviet officers take part in the making of most important decisions relating to their specialized function as organizers of violence and guardians of national security. While the national party leadership retains the prerogative to make final decisions in the defense realm, as in all others, clearly it delegates much of this authority directly to the military establishment, and exercises most of the rest in close consultation with professional soldiers.

Military professionals have managed the Ministry of Defense at its highest level since 1955, and at all other levels since the Civil War. Military men themselves make most of the routine decisions concerning military manpower, weaponry, and strategy. Even on important decisions where a decision by national leaders is required, the military supplies most of the information used in making the choice. When a top-level choice is made, military leaders are directly consulted. As Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii said in 1964 of important defense problems, party leaders "study [the problems] in detail . . . and consult with leading military cadres. Only after this is a concrete decision taken."³ Military participation in key defense

and security decisions is further institutionalized through membership in permanent and ad hoc civil-military defense collegiums (the chief of these is usually called the higher military council).

Clearly, consultation frequently results in deference to military experts. The Soviet military seems to enjoy deference in its professional realm at least as consistently as its American counterpart. In his memoirs, Premier Nikita Khrushchev described how he told United States President Dwight Eisenhower in 1959 that the process of deciding on major strategic and weapons programs was "just the same" in the two countries:

Some people from our military department come and say, "Comrade Khrushchev, look at this! The Americans are developing such and such a system. We could develop the same system, but it would cost such and such." I tell them there's no money; it's all been allotted already. So they say, "If we don't get the money we need and if there's a war, then the enemy will have superiority over us." So we discuss it some more, and I end up giving them the money they ask for.⁴

United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had the similarity of the consultative processes in mind in July, 1974, when he pointed to the way military leaders in both countries try to convince their political superiors not to reach new accords on arms limitation. "Both sides," he said, "have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint, and that does not come easily to either side."⁵

There is no clear line between the advice solicited by civilians and that proffered at military initiative. While Khrushchev grumbled in his memoirs about military "pressure" on or even "intimidation" of the party leadership, there is no evidence that he sought to constrain military executives from speaking their minds on defense issues. "I don't reproach the military for that—they're only doing their job."⁶ Military memoirs show that even Joseph Stalin demanded a constant flow of information and opinions from his military associates.

As in the United States, there has been some spillover in the Soviet military's political participation in both dimensions, scope and means. On the scope dimension, there has been a continuum of other issues, with a wide variation in relevance to the army's professional function, on which some military participation in making and implementing decisions has occurred. At one extreme are several areas of policy with no tenable relation to defense needs. The most obvious is civilian construction, in which the Soviet army has long been involved on a limited scale, in a way reminiscent of the United States Corps of Engineers. In Moscow alone, we know that military construction units have built Moscow State University, Sheremet'ev Airport, office and commercial establishments, roads, and "whole blocks" of multi-story civilian housing.⁷ Normally, though, military par-

² A. A. Grechko, *Vooruzhennye Sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), p. 201.

³ *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 17, 1964, p. 3.

⁴ Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), p. 572.

⁵ *The New York Times*, July 4, 1974, p. 1.

⁶ Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), p. 540.

⁷ See A. I. Romashko, *Voennye stroiteli na stroikakh Moskvy* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972); and A. N. Komarovskii, *Zapiski stroitelia* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972), pp. 199–202.

ticipation has some palpable if indirect connection to defense needs. For example, the armed forces, particularly their main political administration, direct the country's vast "military-patriotic education" program. Nationalistic and militaristic slogans and symbols flood the Soviet media, and since 1967 each Soviet school has had a full-time "military instructor," usually a retired or reserve officer, to direct "elementary military education" programs. Civil aviation is also a planned component of Soviet military strength; its director holds senior military rank. There has always been major military participation in Soviet scientific research and development, and this, in addition to long-standing ties of interest and cooperation with defense industry, has produced what some in the West have described as a Soviet "military-industrial complex" of dimensions comparable to that in the United States.

On the means dimension, the army has had some limited use of tools of bargaining and influence that go beyond the provision of politically neutral, expert advice. Two deserve special mention. First, military leaders have been given formal standing in elected Communist party organs. Six thousand soldiers sat in local and national party bodies in 1973.⁸ In the Central Committee, military men have made up about one-tenth of the total membership since the 1930's. The 1971 committee contained 31 military members and candidates, 7.8 percent of the total membership of 396. This was by far the highest representation afforded any ministry or institution. At the peak level of the party executive (the Politburo) until the mid-1950's, the military was usually represented by a non-professional military executive such as Kliment Voroshilov or Nikolai Bulganin. In 1956-1957, Defense Minister Zhukov, a career soldier, was made a candidate member, then a full member of the party presidium, only to be dismissed abruptly from all his posts in October, 1957. In April, 1973, the experiment was revived with the promotion of Marshal Grechko to full Politburo membership.

Second, Soviet military leaders have also benefited from association with coalitions and factions, of widely varying composition and durability, with civilian politicians. Stalin's Civil War colleagues clearly had preferential access to his ear in the 1930's, and generals who fought with Khrushchev at Stalingrad are widely thought to have retained special ties with him after his rise to power a decade later. Recently, Western scholars have seen evidence of a personal bond between General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Grechko. Brezhnev is known to have had long personal acquaintance with a number of other senior

military figures, for example, Colonel-General Konstantin Grushevoi, head of the political administration of the Moscow military district since 1965. There is also evidence of less personalized relationships of interest and support between military officials and the civilians in charge of Soviet defense industry. The 1971 Central Committee contained 16 defense industry executives and 16 others with at least five years' administrative experience in defense production. Some of these men held very high posts, indeed, the most senior being Dmitrii Ustinov, a Central Committee secretary and Politburo candidate.

These extensions in the scope and means of the military's political participation beyond the minimal pattern of provision of expert advice on professional issues are real and important. But they should not obscure the crucial fact about the Soviet army's political behavior—its stability. There has been no movement whatever toward military rule, in which the army would use all available means, including force, to press its participation on all issues before the polity. On the means dimension, the only innovation of the Brezhnev era has been Grechko's co-optation into the Politburo. Even this is a limited development, and hardly the harbinger of a coming period of military ascendancy. Grechko was one of three men promoted to full Politburo membership at the April, 1973, plenum. The two others (Iurii Andropov, head of the security police, and Andrei Gromyko, the foreign minister) are also heads of large and strategically situated institutions. The announcement of the plenum's decision conspicuously listed Gromyko ahead of Grechko, in violation of alphabetical order, and Gromyko has been far more conspicuous at state and party functions in the year and one-half since.⁹ Even with Grechko on the Politburo, military representation on that body (1 of 21 members and candidates, or 4.8 percent) is much smaller than it is in the Central Committee (7.8 percent) and is barely proportional to the military's share in overall party membership.

The army has certainly displayed no inclination whatever to use force to further its institutional aims. These aims have been well served by the regime. The officer corps' material, status, and professional interests have been promoted and defended as effectively as those of any other group in Soviet society. Its members seem largely to have internalized the regime's values, which are energetically propounded within military ranks by the main political administration, the party's military department. Ninety percent of Soviet officers belong to the party or Komсомol, usually from a point early in their careers.¹⁰

On the scope dimension, there has been no tendency for the army to shift its political attention to universal issues. There has been no pressure from outside groups, from ascriptive roles played by officers, or from the regime itself, for the army to turn to such

⁸ P. Efimov, "Dokumenty bol'shogo politicheskogo znacheniiia," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, 1973, no. 7, p. 26.

⁹ See *Prauda*, April 28, 1973, p. 1.

¹⁰ *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 14, 1974, p. 3.

broad concerns as monitoring the nation's economic growth or selecting its political rulers. The only significant increment in military scope since Khrushchev's fall has been the increased military presence in Soviet schools, and this is administered jointly with civilians.

Again, the Grechko promotion does not seem to portend a more expansive military role. Grechko's public remarks continue to be confined to defense and security issues, and his new status is probably best interpreted as an acknowledgment of the army's right to consultation on problems bearing on its specialized function. The military continues to acknowledge, in theory and practice, the Communist party's right to resolve, through its existing institutions, basic issues of government and development for Soviet society, including issues which bear on the army's professional function. As Grechko phrased the acknowledgment recently:

Only the party, armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, is capable of comprehending every political, economic, social, and military phenomenon and event, of profoundly analyzing all of our social and political life, and of setting the proper course for resolving the complex problems of building communism, defending its just cause, and consolidating world peace.¹¹

Within this context of broad agreement on "fundamentals," the military establishment advances and safeguards its positions on individual questions of national policy. While its views have not yet brought about, and are extremely unlikely to bring about, any direct confrontation with the party leadership, there have long been differences of emphasis and priority between the two on a number of issues. These continue to be evident to the careful reader of Soviet public discourse in the 1970's.

POLITICAL-MILITARY DIFFERENCES

The basic difference of emphasis is on the question of the urgency of defense as a national concern and the extent to which defense considerations should be allowed to defer or to prevent progress toward other domestic or foreign policy goals like economic growth or improved relations with the West. Like all military organizations, the Soviet army tends to a pessimistic view of the international environment and a worst-case analysis of enemy capabilities and intentions. It argues that concessions can be wrung from adversaries only from a position of military superiority, and urges the absolute primacy of defense as a claimant on national resources and energies. Soviet military leaders have been particularly insistent on their views during the latest round of détente with the

West. During the public discussion of Western (particularly American) motives and capabilities preceding the twenty-fourth congress's endorsement of détente in 1971, the army repeatedly urged caution and respect for Western "imperialism's" ability to commit "any kind of savagery, atrocity, or crime"¹² in the absence of effective Soviet military restraint. Military spokesmen have elaborated these warnings since then, with increasing emphasis since the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit of May, 1972.

Marshal Grechko's speech to his Supreme Soviet constituents in June, 1974, outlined the typical military argument.¹³ He took note of "positive results" in international relations because of Soviet initiatives, but insisted that successes were a "direct result of the fact that the Soviet Union's policy combines a firm desire for peace with constant readiness for a decisive rebuff to any aggressor." Grechko went on to make an unmistakable plea for continuing military readiness:

The party constantly cautions the Soviet people against indifference or complacency. It stresses that the forces of aggression have been seriously constrained, but not rendered harmless. Imperialism is still carrying out material preparation for war, expanding its production of military equipment and weaponry, and insistently perfecting its gigantic military machine. We are all witnesses to the many unsightly maneuvers by the opponents of an improvement in the international climate, to ferocious attacks by the most reactionary imperialist circles on the process of reducing tensions, to attempts to put obstructions on the road to peace.

The danger of war remains a stern reality of our time. In these conditions, the party and Soviet state proceed as before from the assumption of the inseparability of peace from national defense. They see to it, and must henceforth see to it, that no potential aggressor is able to mistake the U.S.S.R.'s love of peace for a sign of weakness.

Lesser military figures have often drawn even more forceful conclusions. In August, 1972, for instance, two officers writing in the journal of the main political administration (which supports the military position on most issues) reminded their readers that recent "positive events" in international affairs occurred only "in circumstances of the continuing and unchanged aggressive nature of imperialism." They argued that peaceful coexistence had significance only for "relations between states," and had no bearing on continuing Soviet support for anti-Western forces within other states. Détente cast "not the slightest doubt" on the justice of national liberation struggles. These would intensify in future, as would the need for "in-

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¹¹ Grechko, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

¹² General of the Army Aleksei Epishev in *Pravda*, March 25, 1971, p. 2.

¹³ *Krasnaia zvezda*, June 5, 1974, p. 2.

"... it is clear that the Soviet Union has weathered the raw material crisis better than the other industrialized countries. In fact, in many ways during 1973 and 1974, the Soviet Union seems to have improved its relative standing."

The Soviet Economy in a World of Shortages

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THE YEAR 1973 was a bad year for clichés. Until 1973, hardly anyone ever disputed the charge that "the rich industrialized countries of the world dominated the poor developing countries." That is certainly not the case today. There are still rich countries and still poor countries—but in the wake of the oil blockade and the price increases that followed the Yom Kippur invasion of Israel, the rich are no longer necessarily industrialized, nor are the poor necessarily underdeveloped.

The oil crisis helped to precipitate an economic crisis in Japan and the countries of West Europe, which in turn set off a series of political crises. Thus, as a result of the surge in the cost of imports, particularly petroleum, Italy found herself in mid-1974 with a massive balance of trade deficit. This brought her close to international bankruptcy. Great Britain, France and Denmark were faced with similar situations. The United States was also faced with the possibility of a renewed balance of trade deficit. Even Japan, the economic miracle of the 1960's, could not escape. Not only did her bill for raw material imports swamp her export earnings, but in the ensuing economic readjustment, her GNP fell. This was the first time the Japanese GNP had fallen since 1964.

How has this sudden change in world economic and power relationships affected the U.S.S.R.? Prior to 1973, the Soviet Union seemed to be having more than its share of economic disappointments.¹ Its rate of economic growth seemed to be lagging and its agricultural shortcomings were a major embarrassment. Presumably, the recent turmoil has compounded So-

viet economic problems. Surprisingly, however, although some of the basic structural problems remain or are likely to become worse, it is clear that the Soviet Union has weathered the raw material crisis better than the other industrialized countries. In fact, in many ways during 1973 and 1974, the Soviet Union seems to have improved its relative standing.

Before discussing how the Soviet Union has benefited from the raw material crisis of 1973 and 1974, let us review Soviet economic growth in recent years and see how the domestic economic problems in the Soviet Union have affected and will continue to affect that growth.

SOVIET STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

During the 1960's and early 1970's, the Soviet economic situation turned somewhat sour. Compared to the astounding growth days of the 1930's and the 1950's, the annual growth rate of Soviet national income, by the mid-1960's, showed a noticeable decline. As reflected in official Soviet data, in the 1950's, the yearly increase in Soviet national income reached almost 11 percent.² Subsequently it fell to 7 percent or less. This decline gave rise to the "Liberman debates and reforms," which were intended to arrest this decline by authorizing more power for Soviet managers and reducing bureaucratic controls. Enthusiasm for these reforms soon diminished, however, particularly when Soviet growth did not seem to improve significantly.

Western economists have long been skeptical of the size of Soviet growth rates as reported by Soviet officials. To many observers, Soviet statistics seem overstated. Yet even when Soviet figures are recalculated on a more realistic basis, the results indicate the same fall in the rate of growth from the 1950's to the 1960's. Thus, according to Stanley H. Cohn of SUNY of Binghamton, the growth of Soviet national income fell from 6.4 percent a year in 1950-1958 to 3.4 per-

¹ Marshall I. Goldman, "The Soviet Economy: New Era or the Old Error?" *Current History*, October, 1973, p. 168.

² Abram Bergson, "Soviet Economic Perspectives: Toward a New Growth Model," *Problems of Communism*, March-April, 1973, p. 3.

cent a year in 1967–1970. Since the economy was still growing, many countries of the world would have been satisfied with these results. Yet the growth rate did fall and no matter what the Russians did, they were not able to duplicate their earlier accomplishments. These trends continued into 1973.

A DECLINING GROWTH RATE

This fall in growth has taken place despite the relatively constant percentage increase in the labor force and capital stock. This implies, as Abram Bergson of Harvard shows, that the factor productivity of Soviet labor and capital has sharply declined.³ This is an ominous trend in any society. But because of their stultifying incentive system and their tendency to concentrate research and development in university or research laboratories rather than on the factory floor, the Russians have lagged far behind the rest of the industrialized world in most nonpriority and non-military areas of technology and innovation. There are many indications that the Russians are trying hard to reverse this process. Unless they succeed, every unit of new capital and labor added to the Soviet economy will produce less than similar units added in the 1950's. In other words, the Russians will have to run faster to produce as much as they did a decade ago.

Unfortunately, it may not be easy or even possible for them to run faster. Unless other existing trends in the U.S.S.R. are reversed, there seems to be considerable doubt whether or not the Russians will be able to expand their labor and capital stock as much as they did in the past. Murray Feshbach of the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the United States Department of Commerce has calculated that the increase in the size of the population of able-bodied workers in the Soviet Union will fall off sharply in the years ahead. According to his calculations, the work force increased by about 740,000 workers a-year between 1958 and 1965, by about 1,600,000 a year from 1966 to 1970, and by about 2,570,000 between 1971 and 1975.⁴ After 1974, however, because of the echo effect of the loss of life in World War II and the increasing reluctance of urban residents and adults of great Russian stock to have more than one or two children, the number of new workers available to join the labor force will begin to fall. Thus, based on the existing population structure of children in the U.S.S.R., there will only be an average of 2,146,000 workers a year entering the labor force from 1976 to 1980. Thereafter, the average will

fall shockingly to about 600,000 a year for the next 10 years. Needless to say, Soviet officials are troubled by this prospect.

There is little reason to assume that this decline in the labor force can be compensated for by an increase in the amount of new capital available for investment. As Bergson points out, growing attention to consumer needs and a noticeably revised ordering of priorities in the current five-year plan has resulted in increased allocation of resources for consumer projects. Although most Soviet consumers probably feel that not enough has yet been diverted, the changed policy means that there will be a diversion of resources that otherwise would be available for investment. Thus, with the prospect that there will be not only a decline in investment funds and in the number of new workers entering the labor force, but also a fall in factor productivity, it is all but inevitable that the Soviet economy will grow even slower in the future.

CHANGES IN FOREIGN TRADE

So much for the bad news. Isn't there any good news? Is the international economic situation any better for the Russians? At first glance it appears that recent international trends will only exacerbate the Soviet economic situation. The current worldwide inflation will make it more expensive for the Russians to buy what they want. This will hurt because the Russians are apparently counting heavily on imports from the industrialized world to compensate for their domestic shortcomings. From the number and the nature of the contracts already signed, Soviet planners apparently expect that foreign technology will increase their factor productivity. An unusually large number of complete factories or production units are being purchased. Since foreign firms and manufacturing processes generally tend to be more productive than their own, the Russians have apparently concluded that the best way to bring Soviet productivity up to international standards is to buy up that technology, lock, stock, and machine tool, and ship it to the U.S.S.R. That may be a suitable option, but only as long as the Soviet government can afford the large sums of foreign exchange required or can obtain credits. And, indeed, very large sums will be needed if foreign purchases are going to prevent Soviet technology from lagging further behind. Moreover, with world-wide inflation, whatever the Russians want to buy will cost them increasingly more than they had anticipated.

This must all seem very familiar to Soviet economic authorities. In the 1920's, 1930's and 1960's, the Russians also sought to use foreign technology to upgrade their domestic productive capabilities. Nor is this the first time they have apparently been limited by a shortage of foreign exchange. On several occasions since the revolution, the Russians have found that

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴ Murray Feshbach, "Manpower Management in the U.S.S.R.," June 6, 1974. Paper presented at the Conference on Soviet Resource Management and Environment, University of Washington, Seattle.

their import needs have exceeded their export potential, at least in their dealings with the hard currency countries. Yet not since the 1930's have the Russians entered with such intensity into foreign markets as they are doing in the 1970's. Are they once again to be frustrated by a deterioration in world markets that will make it impossible for them to buy many of the products they want?

The good news is that (unlike the situation in other industrial countries) recent price movements in international markets have helped considerably more than they have hurt Soviet economic interests. Though the prices of what the U.S.S.R. wants to buy have risen, the prices of what they are able to sell have gone up even faster, sometimes by as much as two or three times more. Equally important, the Russians reported that their grain harvest in 1973 reached a record high. Because no new foreign grain purchases had to be made, Soviet currency reserves were spared for machinery imports. First reports in 1974 suggest that the Soviet harvest may not be so bountiful as it was in 1973, but it will probably still be better than it was in 1972. Again, that will free additional hard currency from the need to buy grain and make it available for machinery.

GAINS IN THE ECONOMY

The main gain for the Soviet economy stems from the fact that the Soviet Union covers the largest land mass in the world. By the law of averages, this land mass should contain a large quantity of raw materials—and it does. At one time, countries that were rich in land or raw materials and poor in industry or capital were pitied. This is no longer true. Now, along with the oil-producing Arab countries in the Middle East, the Soviet Union is in a new bargaining position. All the available evidence indicates that the Russians have taken full advantage of their present opportunity.

It is little appreciated, but next to the United States, in 1973, the Soviet Union was the world's second largest producer of petroleum. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union is able to export large quantities of oil because its domestic need for petroleum is still relatively modest. In fact, in 1972, it exported 107 million tons of oil and in 1973, it exported 118 million tons. That placed the Soviet Union fifth behind Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, and Kuwait as a leading exporter of petroleum in both years. Of course about 70 percent of the petroleum the Soviet Union exports goes to East Europe and Finland for soft currency. If all these exports had been diverted to hard currency consumers and if the Russians had received the \$10-\$15 a barrel price that prevailed in 1974, the Soviet Union would have earned between \$7 billion and \$11 billion more than they actually earned in 1972. Thus from the sale of their oil the

Russians could make windfall profits almost as large as those made by Venezuela and Kuwait. Even without diverting any petroleum from their East European allies or from Finland, the Soviet Union in 1974 is still likely to earn \$1.5 billion to \$2.5 billion more in hard currency revenue than the \$500 million or so it earned in 1972. There were already signs of this in 1973. Prices of Soviet petroleum sold to the hard currency countries were raised sharply during the Yom Kippur War. Thus, because of oil price increases that were made only during the last quarter of 1973, the Russians apparently doubled their total export earnings for the whole year from the \$500 million earned in 1972.

The declared earnings are in addition to certain hard currency earning exports that do not show up in the official Soviet statistics. For reasons best known to themselves, the Russians exclude from their statistics their exports of uncut diamonds and gold. Based on the statistics of the importing country, however, these increased significantly in 1973. More important, the Russians were able to sell their arms to Egypt and Syria for dollars for the first time. This was made possible because of Saudi Arabian financial support to these countries. Reportedly this brought the Russians another \$2 billion-\$6 billion in cash or credits.

These developments eased or eliminated the Soviet Union's hard currency trade deficit in 1973. Even if there are no further arms sales, as long as the price of raw materials remains high for the rest of 1974, the Russians should be more than able to pay for their purchases of hard currency goods and still have significant reserves left over. Thus they now can spend larger sums than they had anticipated as recently as 1972.

EXPORT TRADE

Table I shows the major types of raw materials exported by the Soviet Union to the hard currency countries in 1972. After oil comes timber. Even though the price of timber has not moved so rapidly as the price of petroleum, the general trend of raw material prices for goods like coal, aluminum and iron ore is up. Thus the Russians are in a position to gain from a sale of these commodities as well. Moreover, the Soviet Union extended its natural gas pipeline to West Germany in October, 1973, and the shipment of gas through this pipeline will increase Soviet earning power significantly. Similarly, a pipeline was opened to Austria and Italy in May, 1974. Initially the bulk of the Soviet earnings will be diverted to repay the loans extended by the Germans, Austrians and Italians to build the pipeline, but once the loans are paid the delivery of Soviet gas will increase Soviet hard currency earning power.

For the Russians to maintain the flow of their raw material exports, they must maintain, and increase

Table I: Exports of Major Soviet Commodities to the Hard Currency Countries in 1972 (\$ millions)

	Alumi- num	Oil and Oil Products	Timber and Timber Products	Cotton	Coal	Furs	Copper	Ferrous Metal	Palladium	Platinum
Austria		18		5	14			7		
Belgium		43	21	3	5			5		
Denmark		12	2		2	1		1		
France	6	52	33	33	21	1		2		
Great Britain	5	2	83	15		32	13	18		
Greece		21	8		1					
Italy		132	29	12	23	2		34		
Japan	15	19	175	90	39			10		
Netherlands	3	49	14				56	2		
Sweden	1	70			12	2		12		
Switzerland		17								
United States*		76				3			44	13
West Germany		115	28	8		10	6	5		
TOTAL	30	550	393	166	117	48	75	96		
Finland		197	28	10	30	1	2	25		

*1973

Source: *Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR*, 1972, U.S. Bureau of East-West Trade

wherever possible, the exportable surplus of such commodities. Yet as the Soviet gross national product increases, the Russians may be forced to preempt larger and larger portions of that flow for their own domestic needs. This has led some observers to conclude that the Russians will therefore have smaller surpluses available for export in the future. In particular, Leslie Dienes, of the University of Kansas, has argued that the Russians will soon be dipping into their valuable petroleum stocks to fuel their own electrical industry and transportation needs.⁵ Whether or not this conclusion is correct, fortunately for the Russians the disappearance of an exportable surplus will probably not be so serious as it would have been a few years ago. With the four-fold to six-fold jump in the price of petroleum, the Russians can easily afford to curtail the absolute amount of petroleum exports by 50 percent or more and still bring in more dollars than they received in 1972.

Although a decline in export shipments from the Soviet Union will probably only dent, not obliterate, the new Soviet export earning opportunities, the Russians would clearly like to increase their domestic consumption of raw materials like petroleum at the same time that they increase their exports wherever possible. Export earnings must continue to accumulate if the Russians are going to be able to afford the foreign factories and machinery necessary to increase their industrial productivity. But Soviet productivity in mining and resource extraction operations is relatively low. Moreover, many deposits are located in remote

or climatically difficult areas where current Soviet technology has generally proved to be far behind the efficiency of world technology. Thus, in mining as well as in general industrial production a high priority must be given to the importation of foreign technology. This includes drilling and mining equipment as well as pipeline and other shipping accessories. The Russians are spending enormous sums on such materials even though this was regarded as one area where they were self-sufficient, if not comparatively far advanced, in their production technology.

CONTRACTS AND NEGOTIATIONS

Whenever possible, the Russians seek to obtain or pay for such equipment by means of a barter agreement—the foreign machinery in exchange for the raw materials that the machinery will be used to extract. This has been the basis of the agreements worked out with the West Germans for natural gas, with the Japanese for coal and timber, and with Occidental Petroleum of the United States for Soviet ammonia derived from Soviet natural gas. The Russians have also tried to make similar arrangements with American corporations that want to use Soviet natural gas. Just how important such arrangements can be is indicated in Table II, which lists many of the major contracts signed between American corporations and the U.S.S.R. Among the companies selling or hoping to sell products that will be used to facilitate the output of raw materials are TRW, Allis Chalmers, J. F. Pritchard, Occidental Petroleum, Bechtel, International Harvester, Caterpillar, El Paso Natural Gas, Tenneco, Brown and Root, and Texas Eastern Transmission. In addition, the West Germans have signed a billion dollar contract to help the Russians develop

⁵ Leslie Dienes, "Soviet Electric Power: Problems and Trends in Resource Use." Paper presented at the Conference on Soviet Resource Management and the Environment, University of Washington at Seattle, June 7, 1974.

Table II
Selected Contracts

COMPANY	PRODUCT	AMOUNT (million)
TRW	Petroleum production equipment—submersible pumping units	\$ 20
Reda Pump Division		
Baxter Lab	Design and equipment for enzyme plant	\$ 20
Continental Can	Can-making plant	\$ 11
Litwin Division (French) of Amtel	Styrene-polystyrene	\$ 100
"	Polyurethane	\$ 40
Lummus & Monsanto	Acetic acid	\$ 45
Allis Chalmers	Iron ore pelletizing plant	\$ 35
J. F. Pritchard	Gas treatment plant	\$ 53
Alliance Tool & Die Corp.	Tableware	\$ 26
Atlas Fabrication		?
Honeywell	Computer	\$ 65
IBM	Computer	\$ 10
Occidental Petroleum-Bechtel	Hotel	\$ 80
"	Fertilizer deal	\$8-20 billion
IT&T	Electronic message switching system	\$ 1.3
Pepsi Cola	Vodka	?
International Harvester	Turbine powered gas compressor	\$ 25
"	Pipelaying equipment	\$ 40
Caterpillar	Tractor and pipelaying equipment	\$ 68
Chemical Construction Corporation	Ammonia plants	\$ 200
Dresser Industries	Compressors	\$ 27.5
Selected Negotiations		
GM	Earth moving equipment	\$ 100
"	Truck factory	\$1000
Raytheon	Air traffic control system	\$ 80
IBM	Air traffic control system	\$ 250
Control Data	Computer	?
Bechtel	Pipeline	?
El Paso Natural Gas & Occidental Petroleum	Natural gas	\$ 2-3 billion
Tenneco-Brown & Root & Texas Eastern Transmission Co.	Natural gas	\$ 2-3 billion

a steel mill at Kursk in Central Russia, and the Finns are doing much the same thing at Kostamus in Karelia.

IMPORT PRIORITIES

The Soviets' first priority is to import equipment that will upgrade their industrial operation, particularly in the area of electronics, computers and chemicals, where they have had particular difficulty in keeping abreast of international technology. Recently they have also been spending hundreds of millions of dollars for equipment to increase their output of raw materials. They seem to realize that this apparent diversion is necessary in order to guarantee their access to even longer-run earnings of foreign exchange, which, in turn, will make possible the importation of other productive equipment.

Presumably, the Russians assume that this strategy will only be temporary. Undoubtedly, they think that once they are able to obtain sophisticated computers and programmed machine tools as well as other electronic equipment, they will be able to increase productivity. More important, they will then be able to produce their own products and innovations, which will allow them henceforth to keep abreast of world productivity. If Soviet industry can generate its own momentum, this should free the Soviet Union from the need to spend massive sums on foreign technology. At the least, renovation of Soviet industrial technology should make Soviet machinery competitive in international markets. It is true that the Soviet Union is already one of the world's largest producers and exporters of machine tools. To the dismay of the Russians, however, the only countries in the world that will buy such Soviet products at present are the nations of East Europe, and the developing countries. If these countries had enough hard currency available, or political or economic freedom of choice, they would very likely shop elsewhere. When other options are available, the Soviet Union cannot compete. As Table III indicates, the Russians usually end up buying as much as 10 or 20 times as much machinery from the industrialized countries of the world as they sell to them. Consequently, it will be some time before

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"... The foreign trade institutions of the Soviet Union and the United States will remain incompatible," notes this specialist, who believes that "a deradicalized Soviet Union will engage in piecemeal foreign-trade reform, retaining the basic structure of bureaucratic controls."

Recent Trends in Soviet Trade

BY PHILIP S. GILLETTE

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A PERENNIAL QUESTION of Sovietology is whether the Kremlin remains animated by a revolutionary ideology. Professor Robert C. Tucker has advanced the general thesis that radical movements tend to lose their revolutionary other-worldliness and make an accommodation to the world as it stands. Specifically, the deradicalization theory holds that the Soviet leadership has become reformist and has adjusted itself to "existing within the very order that it desires to overthrow and transform."¹ The U.S.S.R. is now deeply committed to economic interdependence with the rest of the world, a finding that tends to support the theory of deradicalization.

Let us begin this investigation of deradicalization with a historical survey of Soviet attitudes toward foreign trade. In January, 1918, full of revolutionary optimism, the Bolshevik commissar in charge of foreign trade, M. Bronsky, confidently predicted that external economic ties after World War I would be exclusively with countries ruled by the working class, because very few states would still be governed by the bourgeoisie.² Later, impressed by the resistance of capitalist governments to revolutionary takeover, Lenin conceived of foreign trade as a political weapon to tempt and sow division among the imperialist powers. (For example, by offering to lease the Kamchatka Peninsula on the Pacific Ocean to the American promoter, Washington B. Vanderlip, Lenin hoped to bring the United States into conflict with Japan.) Simultaneously, the Soviet trade delegation sent abroad was expected to serve as a political Trojan horse—as a base for agitation, propaganda, and espionage. As economic tasks acquired greater ur-

gency in the mid-1920's, Moscow gave priority to the economic purposes of trade. Although they never completely disappeared, diplomatic and political objectives dwindled in significance. Thus, in 1924, the U.S.S.R. commenced large-scale purchases of American cotton, needed by the Soviet textile industry, despite the adamant United States refusal to recognize the Soviet state.

Under Stalin, a special doctrine of foreign trade developed, conditioned by the basic goal of national self-sufficiency, a principle enshrined in the 1936 constitution. According to the new teaching, imports had priority, since they provided scarce goods essential for fulfilling the economic plan. Exports, on the other hand, were to be built up only to the extent necessary to pay for imports. Although far removed in spirit from the exuberant militancy of the revolution or the crafty political manipulation of Lenin, the Stalinist approach to trade harmonized with the profound antagonism toward the West epitomized in the political theory of capitalist encirclement.

After Stalin's death, the Kremlin moved toward a carefully differentiated conception of relations with the West. The doctrine of peaceful coexistence was proclaimed at the twentieth party congress in 1956 and reiterated at the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting in 1972. The U.S.S.R. subsequently recognized areas of common interest with the West that called for increased cooperation as well as areas of conflict that called for continued competition. In the light of this political reorientation a fundamentally different approach to foreign trade appeared, embodying two new principles.

1. *Comparative Advantage*. As recently as 1961, a Soviet economist attacked comparative advantage—the concept that each nation in international trade should specialize in producing those commodities in which it has a relative advantage or lower cost—as a "vulgarization of economic science of a crudely apologetic character."³ Nevertheless, it proved impossible to develop all the smaller East European

¹ Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," in *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 185.

² M. Bronsky, "Our Tasks in the Sphere of Foreign Trade," *Pravda*, January 10, 1918, p. 2.

³ Quoted in Carl H. McMillan, "Some Recent Developments in Soviet Foreign Trade Theory," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 12 (fall, 1970), pp. 243-254.

countries toward self-sufficiency on the Stalinist model, and the U.S.S.R. was compelled to seek alternative theoretical guidelines for international socialist trade. Albeit in a number of disguises, comparative advantage was increasingly invoked as a principle to govern the "international socialist division of labor." Clashing with the Stalinist goals of self-sufficiency and import priority, it implied the broadest possible development of foreign trade and a status for exports independent of, and equal to, imports.

Although comparative advantage initially applied only to trade with Communist countries, eventually Russian officials employed it with regard to commerce with non-Communist countries. For instance, Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations N. N. Inozemtsev lauded the

undoubted advantages that are provided by production specialization and industrial cooperation with other countries or on the scale of several countries—whether we are talking about imports of equipment and commodities we need or about our own production facilities that specialize in exports.⁴

The broad adoption of this advocacy of increased interdependence with other countries would seem to constitute *prima facie* evidence of the Soviet deradicalization policy.

2. *Industrial Cooperation.* Economic relations between industrial enterprises involving a greater time span and more operational interdependence than is implied in ordinary commercial transactions are termed industrial cooperation. Agreements for the exchange of scientific and technical information exemplify one type of industrial cooperation important to the Russians—for example, the 1973 accord with Control Data Corporation (U.S.) for joint work in the field of computer research and development. Barter-type deals for the exploitation of natural resources comprise another high-priority form of industrial cooperation. In 1974, the Soviet Union consummated the largest deal of this type in history: it called for the Chemical Construction Corporation (U.S.) and Creusot-Loire Enterprises (France) to construct six ammonia plants at Togliattigrad, and for Occidental Petroleum Corporation (U.S.) to exchange American superphosphoric acid for Soviet ammonia, urea, and potash, and to build the requisite port facilities on the Baltic and Black Seas. The resulting two-way trade, which is estimated at \$20 billion over a 20-year period, not only will be self-financing in terms of the chemicals, but will also allow the Russians to repay Western construction credits, leaving the U.S.S.R. in possession of a significant new hard currency export capacity.

After World War II, industrial cooperation was

initially restricted to Communist and less developed countries, where the Soviet Union usually supplied the credit and technology and received raw materials or manufactures in payment (e.g., the Soviet Union imports steel produced by the plant it erected at Bhilai, India). Now, however, the principle extends also to the West. Alluding to West European commerce, Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev asserted in 1973 that "agreements on economic, industrial and technical cooperation represent a qualitatively new stage in the development of the U.S.S.R.'s foreign economic ties."⁵

Because it is only a form of international specialization, industrial cooperation would not be discussed separately from comparative advantage were it not for its particular relevance to deradicalization. Industrial cooperation implies a *long-term* and a *far-reaching* interdependence. The signing of such long-term accords not only with Communist, but also with less developed and developed nations, strongly indicates that Moscow has adjusted itself to "existing within the very order that it officially desires to overthrow and transform."

THE PATTERN OF TRADE

One may also look for signs of deradicalization in the patterns of foreign trade. Thus, if comparative advantage and industrial cooperation have any real force, it should be possible to discover evidence of rational economic calculation in the size, distribution, and composition of Soviet foreign trade. Similarly, one may find clues revealing what political objectives, if any, motivate Russian trade. Whereas the existence of revolutionary goals militates against the deradicalization theory, the predominance of ordinary great-power goals tends to support the deradicalization hypothesis.

The Soviet Union's participation in international trade is comparatively low. Its annual foreign trade turnover amounts to 5–6 percent of Gross National Product. Characteristically, in 1971 Russia ranked ninth in world exports, although it was second in world GNP. Total trade turnover in 1973 reached \$42.3 billion, including exports of \$21.3 billion and imports of \$21.0 billion (see Table I).

While the size and wealth of the Soviet economy permitted such isolation in the past, Soviet officials have concluded that continued abstention from world intercourse is no longer wise. Thus, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev asserted in 1973 that "broad international division of labor is the only basis for keeping pace with the times and abreast of the requirements and potentialities of the scientific and technological revolution. This, I should say, is now axiomatic."⁶ Consequently, Soviet foreign trade grew 9 percent per year on the average during 1967–1971, 20 percent during 1972, and 34 percent during

⁴ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 25, no. 20, p. 12.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 25, no. 52, p. 1.

⁶ *Foreign Trade* (Moscow), 1974, no. 1, p. 1.

1973. When interpreting trade data for 1973, one must take into account both the accelerating price inflation (particularly on basic commodities) and the 10 percent depreciation of the dollar in February. For instance, one Soviet analyst more conservatively places Russia's foreign trade increase during 1973 at 20 percent, of which the "actual growth in the physical volume" was 16 percent.⁷ Nevertheless, this still represents a sizable expansion, even against the estimated 36 percent increase in 1973 in exports of the non-Communist world, of which the real growth was about 12 percent.

Table I: Geographical Distribution of Soviet Foreign Trade for 1960, 1970-1973 (billions of current dollars)*

Region or Country	1960	1970	1971	1972	1973
Total Turnover	11.2	24.5	26.3	31.5	42.3
Communist Countries	8.2	16.0	17.2	20.3	24.7
East Europe	5.8	13.4	14.5	17.4	20.9
China	1.6	†	0.2	0.3	0.3
Less Developed Countries	0.9	2.6	2.8	4.1	6.3
Developed Western Countries	2.0	5.1	5.6	7.1	11.3
West Germany	0.3	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.6
United States	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.7	1.6
Japan	0.1	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.3

* Source: U.S.S.R. Foreign Trade Ministry, statistical handbooks.

† Less than \$0.1 billion.

TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

The Communist countries represent the main Soviet trading region, accounting in 1960 for 73 percent and in 1973 for 60 percent of total Soviet trade. In 1973, trade with this region aggregated \$24.7 billion, comprising exports of \$12.3 billion and imports of \$12.4 billion. Due to the continuing Sino-Soviet conflict, trade with China in 1973 declined to less than one-fifth of the 1960 level. In contrast, vital security interests assure a high priority for trade with East Europe, which in 1973 represented 49 percent of total U.S.S.R. trade. The Soviet Union is East Europe's major supplier of basic raw materials and fuel (e.g., oil, gas, pig iron, electricity, etc.), while East Europe provides three-quarters of all Soviet imports of machinery and equipment. The 1973 relative decline in East Europe's trade share may well be a statistical illusion; Moscow seems determined to maintain its economic bonds with East Europe and to strengthen the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which is the East European counterpart of the West European Common Market.⁸ Thus,

responding to the world energy crisis, CMEA's governing body in July, 1974, approved the construction of a new electric power line and gas line between the U.S.S.R. and East Europe.

The Soviet Union's industrial cooperation with East Europe is remarkable. The U.S.S.R. specializes in producing front axle assemblies for buses; Hungary specializes in rear axle assemblies. The Soviet Union has built or is building large metallurgy and power plants and has supplied or is supplying equipment for chemical and petrochemical factories in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland. The Soviet Union is now urging the East Europeans to help develop new raw material sources in the U.S.S.R., and two such projects have already been approved: an asbestos mining and enriching works at Kiyembayevsky near Orenburg and a pulp mill at Ust-Ilim north of Irkutsk. The latter will have an annual capacity of 250,000 tons of pulp and will be built with the aid of advance deliveries from Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The latter will be repaid by deliveries of pulp over a 12-year period commencing in 1979.

TRADE WITH LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Soviet commerce with the less developed countries in 1973 amounted to \$6.3 billion, or 15 percent of total trade. This commerce included \$4.0 billion in exports and \$2.3 billion in imports; presumably, Soviet credits financed the \$1.7-billion surplus. Trade with the less developed countries grew 9 percent annually on the average during 1967-1971, 46 percent in 1972, and 54 percent in 1973—a growth that reflected both rising deliveries of Soviet aid to the less developed countries and rising aid repayments by the less developed countries to the U.S.S.R. India and Egypt are the leading less developed countries in Soviet trade and aid. Soviet exports chiefly comprise machinery and equipment; whereas Soviet imports for the most part comprise raw materials and food products.

With respect to the less developed countries, the Soviet Union has always regarded trade and aid as important instruments to reduce the influence of the West and to enhance its own influence. Under Premier Nikita Khrushchev, moreover, officials entertained the notion that certain less developed countries, termed "national democracies" (e.g., Egypt, Ghana, Algeria), would soon evolve, with Soviet assistance, into Communist states. The post-Khrushchev leadership has jettisoned such expectations and is more cautious in making new aid commitments. Concerning this change, a scholar writing in 1973 concludes: "... the great expectations of a decade ago about the prospects for a 'revolutionary advance' have been drastically revised downward."⁹ Nonetheless, the quest for world influence continues to spur economic

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 5, p. 10.

⁸ Besides the six East European allies and the U.S.S.R., CMEA membership extends to Mongolia and Cuba.

⁹ Morton Schwartz, "The USSR and Leftist Regimes in Less-Developed Countries," *Survey*, vol. 19, no. 2 (spring, 1973), p. 232.

relations with the less developed countries (e.g., President Anwar Sadat of Egypt recently charged that the U.S.S.R. had used the supply of weapons and ammunition to his country as an "instrument of policy leverage").¹⁰

Meanwhile, the stubborn Sino-Soviet dispute has doubled Moscow's incentive to cultivate India—against both the United States and China. As another example, the Argentine government's decision to recognize Cuba quickly brought a Soviet pledge in May, 1974, of \$600 million in credits for Argentine power projects. Along with political objectives, the Kremlin has evinced a concern for economic return on its aid—as in laying a pipeline in Iran to deliver natural gas to Soviet industry and building a mine in Guinea to supply bauxite to Soviet aluminum plants (the mine was scheduled to go into production in December, 1973).

TRADE WITH THE DEVELOPED WEST

The Soviet Union's trade with the developed Western countries in 1973 amounted to \$11.3 billion, embracing exports of \$5.1 billion and imports of \$6.2 billion. This commerce rose 10 percent annually on the average during 1967–1971, 27 percent during 1972, and 59 percent during 1973. Whereas in 1960 it comprised 18 percent of total U.S.S.R. trade, in 1973 it represented 27 percent of total trade. Soviet-Western trade features the exchange of Soviet fuels, raw materials, and semi manufactures (oil, coal, wood, cotton, metals, etc.) for Western machinery and other manufactures (chemical equipment, automotive manufacturing equipment, metals, etc.). The Soviet Union finances the characteristic annual hard currency deficits through credits from the West and gold shipments (the U.S.S.R. is a large gold producer). Its principal Western partners in 1973 were Germany, the United States, and Japan. The United States sudden rise to second place as a Soviet partner that year reflected its unusually large grain sales to the Soviet Union in 1972, when the Soviet harvest failed to produce enough.

Diplomatic and political goals entered into Soviet policy toward commerce with the West to a lesser extent than is evident in trade with the less developed countries. Generally, the U.S.S.R. attempted to create through trade a Western constituency favorable to Soviet relations. In discussing Western investments in Siberia, the Kremlin probably sought to enlist the Americans and Japanese as allies in its controversies with China. After the British expelled a large number of Soviet commercial personnel on charges of espionage

in 1963, the Soviets diverted trade elsewhere. But even more important to the Soviets was the urgent economic goal of closing what three eminent Soviet scientists described as an "essential and ever-growing gap between our country and the West extending through the entire spectrum of scientific-technological activity."¹¹

Given the Soviet preference for large-scale projects, it is not surprising that some of the industrial cooperation schemes concluded and under discussion are truly colossal. Contracts have already been signed for a \$450-million credit from Japan to develop coal deposits at Yakutia, Siberia; a German consortium has agreed to build a gigantic steelworks at Kursk for \$1 billion in cash; and Occidental Petroleum will carry out a superphosphate for ammonia-potash-urea swap estimated at \$20 billion over 20 years. Among the ventures still being negotiated are the development of two Siberian fields for the delivery of natural gas to the United States and Japan involving a total Western investment of \$10 billion–\$12 billion, and a triangular deal calling for Iran to supply natural gas to the U.S.S.R. and the latter to transmit natural gas to West Germany.

DERADICALIZATION AND FUTURE TRENDS

To recapitulate the argument, current Soviet foreign trade theory, based on the principles of comparative advantage and industrial cooperation, suggests a kind of deradicalization in the sphere of ideas, because it implies increasing world interdependence. Instances of rational economic calculus and industrial cooperation in actual foreign trade further indicate deradicalization in the area of practice. Finally, the political motives evident in Soviet foreign trade are not revolutionary, but are typical of other great powers acting in the world arena. For example, security considerations cause the U.S.S.R. to give trade with East Europe a high priority, and rivalry with the United States and China induces the U.S.S.R. to cultivate India. The revolutionary policy of fostering "national democracies" in the third world, on the other hand, has been succeeded by a more sober outlook. Thus, the Soviet Union's reformist political goals also appear to give support to the deradicalization concept.

Keeping this conclusion in mind, we offer some speculation about future trends in Soviet trade:

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¹⁰ *The New York Times*, April 22, 1974, p. 1.

¹¹ "Appeal of Scientists A. D. Sakharov, V. F. Turchin, and R. A. Medvedev to Soviet Party and Government Leaders," March 19, 1970, in *Survey* (summer, 1970), pp. 160–170.

"Soviet society is experiencing many of the changes common to industrializing societies. . . . The Soviet citizen enjoys more education, better health care, and a higher standard of living than ever before."

Contemporary Soviet Society

BY VICTOR BARAS

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THE SOVIET UNION has a multi-national population of 250 million. Slightly more than half the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are Russians, and about three-fourths are Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians). The population is increasing at just over one percent per year, with more rapid growth in the less industrialized areas and among the less Westernized national groups. Forty percent of the population lives in rural areas, as compared with 48 percent in 1959 and 80 percent in 1917.¹

It is not easy to give an accurate statistical picture of the Soviet standard of living, for two reasons. First, the relative cost of various goods and services in the U.S.S.R. is rather different from the dominant Western pattern. Second, since most prices are not determined by the interplay of supply and demand but by government decree, the nominal cost of goods and services may not reflect their availability. The official price of many consumer goods is artificially low; the goods in question may be scarce (available at high cost on the black market), or of very poor quality, or simply nonexistent. Nevertheless, if one bears these difficulties in mind, the following selected statistics offer an insight into how the Soviet citizen lives.

The average industrial laborer works about 40 hours a week. The rate of infant mortality is about the same as that of West Germany.² Basic literacy

has been nearly universal since the 1950's, and the average level of education is rising steadily. The number of Soviet citizens with some education beyond primary school increased by 45 percent between 1959 and 1973. The number who have graduated from an institution beyond the high-school level more than doubled in the same period.³

The Soviet authorities compile statistics on the spending patterns of Soviet families. The figures are based on aggregate family income, which means, in general, the income of two wage earners. The aggregate income figure includes the value of free and subsidized services financed from public funds; these benefits reappear as (largely cost-free) "expenditures" in the spending picture. Monetary wages account for only about 75 percent of "income."

According to these figures, the average Soviet laborer's family in 1972 spent 35 percent of its income on food (45 percent of monetary wages).⁴ This represents a continuing decline in the part of the family budget spent for food. The next largest category is "cultural and everyday services" at 23 percent, of which the greater part (14 percent) represents free services such as education and health care. Housing costs amount to only 2.5 percent of aggregate income, or four percent of monetary wage.

The corresponding figures for *kolkhoz* (collective farm) families show that nearly 40 percent of the family budget went for food, as against 35 percent for the worker. "Cultural and everyday services" accounted for only 16 percent of family expenditures. Allowing for the difference between industrial and *kolkhoz* income,⁵ the value of benefits per family in this sector is about twice as high for the industrial worker as for the *kolkhoz* peasant.

WAGES:

Average monthly wage as of January 1, 1973, in rubles⁶

	manual labor	engineering- technical
agriculture (except <i>kolkhoz</i>)	109	176
industry	140	182
construction	160	200

¹ The population figures cited in this passage are 1974 projections based on the Soviet census of 1970: *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naselenia 1970 goda* ("Statistika," Moscow, 1972), vol. 1, pp. 8-9 and vol. 4, pp. 9 and 42-43. Interim estimates are provided in *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972 godu* ("Statistika," Moscow, 1973).

² *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR 1922-1972* ("Statistika," Moscow, 1972), p. 352; *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1972*, p. 46.

³ *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1972*, p. 38.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 562-563.

⁵ Family income on the *kolkhoz* is at least 25 percent lower than in industry. See above.

⁶ *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1972*, pp. 516-517. As of summer 1974, the U.S.S.R. posted an official exchange rate of \$1.34 per ruble. The free market rate in the West at that time was 25¢ for the sale and 40¢ for the purchase of one ruble.

The average monetary wage in the U.S.S.R. is 130 rubles per month.⁷ In addition, according to Soviet calculations, each wage earner receives an average of 46 rubles per month in the form of subsidies and benefits financed from "public funds" (health care, education, pension, and so on). The figures are higher for workers in industry—140 rubles per month in wages, and 52 rubles in benefits. The Soviet Bureau of Statistics pointed out in a footnote to these figures that many families (presumably a majority, although no exact number is given) include more than one wage earner, that the state also invested in 1972 about 250 rubles per family in the construction of new housing, schools, and medical facilities, and that rent charges in the U.S.S.R. are the lowest in the world.

The range of wages corresponds roughly to the level of training required for each job, with a few exceptions. Unskilled and semi-skilled white-collar workers (clerical staff, sales personnel, and so on) are markedly less well paid than factory laborers. There is an almost perfect *negative* correlation between the average wage for a given sector of the economy and the proportion of women workers in that sector. The worst paid sector, public health and physical education (listed as a single category in Soviet statistics), is the sector with the highest proportion of women, 85 percent.

Toward the high end of the scale, senior personnel in large factories receive a monthly salary well in excess of 500 rubles; this category probably includes fewer than a million people.⁸ In this range and beyond, an analysis of salaries no longer tells the whole story. From factory managers up through the Soviet super-elite—political leaders, famous scientists, international artists with an independent income—the standard of living is not so much a matter of money as of privilege. These people have money, but more important—they have the privilege of spending their money on things that money alone cannot buy in the U.S.S.R. They enjoy preferential access

to housing and other perquisites, and they may shop in special stores stocked with merchandise unavailable to the ordinary consumer.

TOWN AND COUNTRY

There is a vast difference between rural and urban life in the Soviet Union. The city dweller enjoys better wages, a higher level of public services, and better educational opportunities. In 1972, 42 percent of all rural working people had no education beyond primary school, compared with 25 percent in the cities, and the gap had narrowed only slightly in the previous 15 years.⁹ Since the city is so much more desirable than the countryside the government forbids residence in large cities without an official permit.

Soviet agriculture consists of two kinds of enterprises, the collective farm, or *kolkhoz*, and the state farm, or *sovkhov*. The *sovkhov* is considered the more advanced form of socialist development. Workers on the *sovkhov* receive a flat wage for their labor; they are employees of the farm, in contrast to *kolkhoz* workers, who are shareholders in a communal enterprise.

Since the *sovkhov* pays wages like a factory, the *sovkhov* laborer is classified as a "worker" rather than a "peasant." Figures on *sovkhov* wages are therefore published regularly. On January 1, 1973, the average monetary wage for a manual laborer on the *sovkhov* was 109 rubles per month.¹⁰

Income statistics for *kolkhoz* peasants are harder to come by. Ordinarily, the *kolkhoz* pays no wages as such. Instead, after deduction of expenses and mandatory deliveries to the state, the "earnings" of the entire farm are divided among the peasants, with each peasant receiving a share proportionate to the number of days he worked for the *kolkhoz*. Thus there is great regional and annual variation in *kolkhoz* income.

According to one Soviet source, payment from the *kolkhoz* in 1971 averaged 4 rubles per man-day of labor; the average laborer received 66 rubles per month for his work on the *kolkhoz*.¹¹ On the basis of these figures, the average *kolkhoz* laborer contributed 204 labor days per year to the collective.

Peasants on both the *sovkhov* and *kolkhoz* supplement their incomes by consuming and/or selling the produce of their "private plots" and privately owned livestock. In the dry words of a Soviet observer, "The existence of the private plots gives rise to a certain conflict between communal and individual interests."¹² In 1972, a typical *kolkhoz* family earned one ruble from private agriculture for every one and one-half rubles earned from the *kolkhoz*.¹³ If one assumes two workers per family and an average payment from the *kolkhoz* of 70 rubles per worker, the average total monetary income per worker in 1972 was under 120 rubles per month.

⁷ The statistics cited here are for January 1, 1973, as published in *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo* 1972, pp. 513-517. The corresponding figures for late 1974 should be five or six percent higher. These figures do not include workers on the collective farms.

⁸ Mervyn Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia* (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1972), p. 92.

⁹ *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo* 1972, p. 39.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 516.

¹¹ Soviet planners hope to raise the average to 98 rubles per month by 1975: I. Matiukha, "The Rise in Living Standards of Working People in the USSR" (*Vestnik Statistiki*, no. 12, 1972), translation in *The Soviet Review*, winter, 1973-74, p. 47.

¹² N. A. Aitov, "An Analysis of the Objective Prerequisites for Eliminating the Distinctions between the Working Class and the Peasantry," in G. V. Osipov, ed., *Industry and Labor in the USSR* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966), p. 122.

¹³ *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo* 1972, p. 563.

THE CONSUMER

The material conditions of life in the U.S.S.R. continue to improve steadily, if not so rapidly as the authorities and the people would like. Yet the life of the Soviet consumer remains a nightmare by Western standards. The supply of many consumer goods is short and unpredictable. The shopper's queue is ubiquitous. At the same time, the market is glutted with shoddy merchandise, much of it unusable. The situation with regard to many personal and household services is especially bad. Simple household repairs frequently require black market or pilfered materials and a moonlighting mechanic. The Soviet Union has less retail floor space per capita than any of its East European allies, including Bulgaria.¹⁴ Per capita consumption has reached the level of Poland, but lags far behind that of East Germany and Czechoslovakia.¹⁵

There is no shortage of consumer aspirations in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet authorities sometimes deplore the appetite for private consumption. Yet they have fanned the flames of rising expectation, especially in recent years, with intensive campaigns to improve the delivery of goods and services to the consumer. Public criticism in this sector is not only tolerated but encouraged (as long as it is not directed against the system as a whole). Indifferent personnel, shortages, pilferage, and shoddy workmanship are leading themes in the Soviet satirical magazine, *Krokodil*.

The Soviet consumer, like his counterpart in many industrializing countries, has a considerable interest in Western gadgets and Western fashions. Western clothing is traded at a premium on the black market, for reasons of style as well as quality. Even in the official media, some admiration for the Western consumer society is apparent. Soviet journalists, reporting on a recent trip through the United States, praised suburban highways with their endless miles of motels, hamburger stands, and service stations, all clearly identified by flashing neon signs that proclaim the universal availability of "public services." At the time of United States President Richard Nixon's visit to Moscow, an American reporter interviewed a Moscow city official who reported almost proudly on the city's traffic jams, the increasing number of accidents, and the rise in traffic-related fatalities.

¹⁴ Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Consumer Problems and Prospects," *Problems of Communism*, March-April, 1973, p. 14.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁶ *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo* 1922-1972, p. 348.

¹⁷ K. Vermishev, "The Stimulation of Population Growth" (*Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, no. 12, 1972), translation in *The Soviet Review*, fall, 1973, p. 6.

¹⁸ *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo* 1972, pp. 513-517.

¹⁹ *Itogi perepisi* 1970, vol. 5, p. 9.

²⁰ Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

²¹ Vermishev, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

²² See for example the article by Vermishev cited above.

²³ Paul Hollander, *Soviet and American Society* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 280.

Women make up over 53 percent of the Soviet population and about half the labor force.¹⁶ Eighty to 85 percent of the women of working age are employed, including 60 percent of the mothers of children under three years of age.¹⁷

There are substantial numbers of women in most occupations, but the proportion of women is higher in jobs with lower pay and lesser responsibility. Women are very well represented in the ranks of unskilled manual labor,¹⁸ and they constitute most of the agricultural field hands. In 1970, women comprised 58 percent of the kolkhoz population.¹⁹ Most migrants from the city to the country are young men.²⁰

There are not enough child care centers to provide for all working mothers. Large modern factories, of the kind the Western visitor is likely to see, generally have such facilities, but about one-third of working mothers with children under the age of three must leave their jobs temporarily. One-third more have their children taken care of "in the family"; ordinarily this means care by a grandmother, a practice supported by tradition and reinforced by the acute housing shortage that forces many families to include three generations in an apartment. Only about one third of working mothers have access to a day care center.²¹

The U.S.S.R. views itself as an underpopulated country with a chronic labor shortage. This view has resulted in a certain official ambivalence toward working women. The regime is strongly committed to the entry of women into the labor force and the professions, but working women, and particularly professional women, tend to have smaller families. One of the consequences of Soviet industrialization has been a decline in the birth rate. As families become more educated and have more disposable income, and as more women have careers, they have fewer children. The authorities are alarmed over this decline, especially since it is most pronounced among the more Westernized segments of the population.²² The state still offers various financial and honorific incentives for childbearing, and the rewards increase with the number of children per mother.

Birth control aids, including the contraceptive pill, are widely available and inexpensive, but their use is not vigorously promoted. The reluctance of the authorities to depress the birth rate even further is compounded by a traditional reticence with regard to public discussion of sex. As a result, abortion remains an important means of birth control. Abortions are practically free, and many Soviet women have had more than one. A 1965 study of abortion among small town and rural women showed that over half the women used no form of contraception.²³

Despite repeated "educational" campaigns in the media, Soviet men still expect their wives to do the

housework. This means not only cooking, cleaning, and child care, but shopping, which, in the U.S.S.R., is a time-consuming activity requiring endless hours of standing in line. In the words of a Soviet source,²⁴ "[E]mployed women have what is called a second working day. . . . As a result, the employed mother has . . . one-half to one-third the free time available to a man." And since the employed woman is less able to devote herself to professional advancement, "despite the abolition of discrimination in pay, women at many enterprises earn less, on the average, than men." The pay differential amounts to at least 20 percent. The "physical and psychological fatigue" of the working mother is cited as a disturbing influence in the home and a major cause of divorce.

CRIME

There are no complete statistics on crime in the U.S.S.R., but certain generalizations can be made on the basis of observation and statements in the Soviet press. Most non-political crime in the Soviet Union falls into one of two categories: a) rowdiness and/or violence connected with drinking, and b) theft or embezzlement of public property, usually from the malefactor's place of work. Much petty crime, and most violent crime, is drink-related. Alcohol is something of a national plague in the U.S.S.R. The regime has tried nearly everything to curb it, from educational campaigns to raising the price of vodka, but the problem persists. Theft from the workplace is a constant problem because of the nature of the economy. Where many commodities are scarce, many commodities are worth stealing. Employees in retail trade are exposed to special temptations, because they frequently handle scarce goods that command a high price on the black market. There is no organized crime in the American sense, although there have been some sophisticated swindles involving big money. Armed robbery is virtually nonexistent. There is some prostitution, but there are few professional prostitutes. The recently announced increases in penalties for possession of narcotics suggest that there is some drug use, but the scope of the problem is miniscule by Western standards.

Most Western observers agree that treatment of non-political offenders in the Soviet courts is generally fair, although penalties are severe by Western standards. Crimes affecting the economic life of the country receive especially harsh treatment; chronic violation of "labor discipline" (i.e., lateness and absenteeism from work) may be punished by a term in a labor camp. Acquittal is virtually out of the ques-

tion; the investigating authorities are expected to establish guilt before bringing a case to court.

THE MEDIA

The mass media in the Soviet Union are, for all practical purposes, house organs of the regime. To say that there is censorship is to point out the obvious, but the word "censorship" is hardly adequate to describe the pervasiveness of control over the (legal) dissemination of information within the country.

Since the content of the media is determined by political decision, it changes, sometimes for the better, in response to political events. One side effect of party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev's détente diplomacy has been much improved coverage of events in West Europe and the United States (beyond the traditional accounts of race riots and strikes). There is also coverage of political controversy within Western countries, especially if it affects the interests of the Soviet Union. News about China, by contrast, is reported in the most strident tones. The lower right corner of the penultimate page of *Pravda* is frequently devoted to anti-Chinese polemics, often in the form of a "news" story announcing that an East European Communist newspaper has attacked the "Maoist clique" in Peking.

In its coverage of the American scene, the Soviet press nowadays frequently gives more favorable treatment to American business interests than to liberal and leftist groups (with the exception of the pro-Soviet Communist party of the United States). In recent years *Pravda* has both attacked *Playboy* magazine and Herbert Marcuse, the ideologist of the "youth culture" of the 1960's. David Rockefeller and the Chase Manhattan Bank enjoy a good press. Americans who express concern about human rights in the Soviet Union are denounced as militarists, cold warriors, and anti-Soviet hysterics.

DISSENT

As with the proverbial talking dog, the most remarkable fact about Soviet dissent is that it exists at all. The average Soviet citizen, particularly the city dweller, is dependent on the regime for all of life's necessities and most of its amenities. He is vulnerable in nearly every aspect of his professional, economic, and social life. He no longer lives in mortal terror of the midnight visit of the secret police, but he is tied to the regime by a thousand threads. Opportunities
(Continued on page 182)

²⁴ A. G. Kharchev and S. I. Golod, "Recommendations of the Symposium on 'Women and the Family,' Minsk, June 21-24, 1969" (*Professionalnaia rabota zhenshchin i semia*, "Nauka," Leningrad, 1971, Appendix II), translation in *The Soviet Review*, winter, 1973-74, p. 56.

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BOOK REVIEWS

On The Soviet Union

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB EAST UNDER KHRUSHCHEV. BY OLES M. SMOLANSKY. (Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell University Press, 1974. 326 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

Professor Smolansky has written an outstanding book on Nikita Khrushchev's policy in the Arab world. He traces the evolution of Soviet policy and its adaptation to key developments in the Arab world, showing the interaction between Soviet policy and Arab domestic politics. The Suez crisis of 1956, the Iraqi revolution of 1958, the creation and dissolution of the United Arab Republic, and Khrushchev's conflicts with Nasser are ably analyzed. The research is impressive, the writing is lucid, and the analysis is sound. This is by far the best book written on the 1955-1964 period of Soviet policy in the Middle East.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY, 3d edition. BY V. D. SOKOLOVSKIY. Translation, Analysis, and Commentary by Harriet Fast Scott. (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1974. 550 pages, \$17.50.)

The late Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy was a leading Soviet military thinker. His writings provide an insight into official Soviet views on war, nuclear weapons, and conventional armed forces. Harriet Fast Scott, a respected analyst on Soviet military affairs, examines the third edition of Sokolovskiy's work and compares it with previous editions. Her introduction and commentary are clearly written and soundly argued. She has performed a useful service for students of Soviet military affairs.

A.Z.R.

THE SOVIET UNION IN ASIA. BY GEOFFREY JUKES. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1973. 304 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.75.)

This commendable survey of Soviet policy toward South and Southeast Asia since the mid-1950's focuses principally on strategic and political relationships. The author believes that strategic considerations do not loom large in Soviet policy toward the Indian Ocean area, but foresees increasing attempts to link the nonaligned countries there to

the U.S.S.R., in some as yet undefined political community.
A.Z.R.

SOVIET NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS: CAPABILITY AND CONTEXT. EDITED BY MICHAEL MCGWIRE. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. 555 pages, appendix and index, \$23.50.)

In the recent war in the Middle East, the Soviet navy played a key role. For the first time, it posed a serious and direct challenge to American postwar supremacy in the Mediterranean.

This volume tells almost all there is to know about the rise and expansion of the modern Soviet navy. The scholarly essays cover an enormous range and are invaluable for an understanding of Soviet strategy and capability. The contributors are among the leading men in the field.

A.Z.R.

A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET SEA POWER. BY DONALD W. MITCHELL. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1974. 657 pages, bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

The Soviet navy has come of age. During the October, 1973, Arab-Israeli war, for the first time in Soviet history, it was used in a provocative fashion as an adjunct of the Kremlin's diplomatic strategy. Increasingly, it will figure in the continuing superpower rivalry.

This clearly written and well-organized study traces the ups-and-downs of Russian naval power from Peter the Great to the downfall of the Romanov dynasty. Dozens of vignettes jot the narrative as Mitchell leads us through two centuries of wars and battles. There is a systematic presentation of the rise of the Soviet navy, its strategic role and technological development. The detail is impressive and will make fascinating reading for any history buff.

A.Z.R.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DEVELOPING NATIONS. EDITED BY ROGER E. KANET. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974. 302 pages, index, \$12.50.)

The 10 essays in this volume present a solid, informative assessment of Soviet policy toward the key regions of the third world. They are well researched and ably analyzed. What emerges from this overview is a sense of the U.S.S.R.'s sustained.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL

(Continued from page 154)

reductions based on "equal numbers" or "equal percentages" NATO advanced the goal of equal numbers of troops after completion of reductions. From the Soviet point of view, both sides started with an "effective balance" of forces, within which some Warsaw Pact advantages (for example in numbers of troops and armor) were offset by other NATO advantages (for example in aircraft and tactical nuclear weapons).¹³ Furthermore, Soviet commentators pointed to an overall balance in a broader geographical area than the limits of the MFR negotiations to Central Europe.¹⁴

Thus, MFR was stalemated on precisely that difference of concept which had dogged the whole idea since its inception in 1968. Furthermore, this issue of "balance" takes on far more serious tone if it is projected against the parallel issue of "parity" in the strategic forum. One of the key issues with implications for both MFR and SALT II is the question of forward based systems (FBS). Although the term defies precise definition, it refers basically to 550 F-111E's and F-4's based in Europe. Of these aircraft, about 100 are maintained in a "quick-reaction" (QRA) state of readiness, and these particularly give the Soviets concern in the strategic context. FBS also refers to approximately 500 to 600 F-4's and A-4's and 6's based on carriers of the Sixth and Second fleets that might be assigned to the European theater in the case of hostilities. From the American and NATO point of view these aircraft are assigned to a theater role and are designed to offset the Soviet IRBM/MRBM and the tactical aircraft threat against West Europe. They argue, therefore, that they cannot be included in the bilateral balance. But NATO has also defined MFR in such a way as to exclude these forces, and the Soviets have persistently raised the question in both the MFR and SALT contexts. FBS is symbolic of the inseparability of the two sets of negotiations. The bilateral strategic relationship cannot be separated from the multilateral and conventional one. There is danger that NATO will prevent the inclusion of those very forces that might give it some leverage in the discussions.

There are, therefore, two sources of instability for

the international environment that find their source in MFR. First, the problem of definition for those forces to be included—especially FBS and tactical nuclear weapons—threatens to devalue the results of the negotiations. There is a danger that they will insufficiently engage real Soviet security interests, and that therefore they will result in no more than a symbolic reduction of conventional forces. Second, the achievement of strategic parity threatens the whole basis of NATO defense policy. If one accepts the assumption that NATO's conventional forces are inferior to those of the Warsaw Pact, strategic parity might be thought to leave NATO with an overall deficiency in security. In that case, especially a devalued MFR seems counter to NATO interests. If one assumes, on the other hand, that something like a conventional balance in Europe does exist, then there should be no objection to framing an agreement more along the lines of the Soviet proposals than those of NATO—i.e., with equal numerical or percentage cuts in forces.

The definition of strategic parity probably requires the joining of SALT II and MFR in some manner. The destabilizing impact of the prospective strategic parity in particular requires that American allies be involved thoroughly in the redefinition of the security environment for Europe. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have a long-term interest in obtaining an agreed definition of European security because the alternative might be that both will lose their political leverage on the development of military power in West Europe.

CSCE: A POLITICAL DIMENSION

Against these momentous issues of the bilateral strategic balance and the partially derivative multilateral conventional balance in Europe, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe appears pale indeed. The discussions opened in their first phase with a foreign ministers' conference in Helsinki during July, 1973. That conference had been prepared by six months of preparatory negotiations that ran parallel to similar preparation for the MFR talks in Vienna. In fact, the two sets of talks had been tied intimately since 1971, when the Soviet Union made its first tentative indication that it would participate in the force reduction talks and when, at its December Council meeting, NATO recognized that progress on the Berlin issue had undercut that precondition to its own participation in a security conference, and proposed its own agenda for CSCE. The two sets of talks had remained "tied" in an informal way when the CSCE moved to its second, working-session phase on September 18, 1973. Although there was no explicit linkage between them, it was generally felt that the Soviet Union had greater

¹³ See, for example, I. Melnikov, *Pravda*, April 10, 1974, p. 4; the two most explicit commentaries are articles by K. Borisov, *New Times*, no. 50 (Moscow), December, 1973, pp. 4-5 and no. 12, March, 1974, pp. 6-7.

¹⁴ See Yu. Kostko, "Military Confrontation and the European Security Problem," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, no. 9 (Moscow), September, 1972, pp. 17-25; D. Proektor, "European Security, Some Problems," *ibid.*, September, 1973, pp. 87-98.

interest in CSCE and that NATO had greater interest in MFR. NATO and the United States hoped that Moscow could be induced to negotiate serious force reductions by refusing to give the Soviets the proposed heads-of-state conference to ratify the results of CSCE and the status quo in Europe until after the results of MFR were assured.

The principal issue in CSCE emerged from that same December, 1971, NATO Council meeting. There the NATO ministers had proposed that the agenda of the security conference include an item on "freer movement of peoples." Although there was some evidence of vacillation in the Soviet response to this idea, Brezhnev had set the positive limit of how far the Warsaw Pact would go to accommodate the Western view in a speech on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the U.S.S.R. in December, 1972.¹⁵ That limit declared that the exchange of ideas could not interfere with the sovereignty of the states concerned. By April, 1973, this had been translated into a diplomatic phrase—that the "freer movement" idea was acceptable only in conformity with the "laws, customs and sovereignty" of participating states. Although temporary and procedural compromises were made in the spring of 1973 to make possible the July foreign ministers' conference and to enable the definition of an agenda and organizational structure for the working sessions of the second phase of CSCE, which began in September, 1973, the second phase of CSCE has bogged down since then on precisely that issue. Although additional difficulties were experienced with regard to the wording of guarantees against the violation of borders in Commission One and on the nature of the preambles for the entire document that would eventually emerge from the working sessions, the essential difficulty has come over the work of Commission Three—over "freer movement."

The issue in Commission Three seems simple enough. The Western states, whose enthusiasm for CSCE was always marginal, felt that the Soviet Union should pay some price for the multilateral legitimization of its position in East Europe and for expanded access to the technology markets of the West, and they decided that some agreements to humanize contacts between East and West and to mitigate the worst features of police state oppression might contribute to a longer-term improvement in relations between the divided halves of Europe. The Soviet Union, and some of its East European allies as well, thought the whole idea smacked of cold war ideology and worried about "ideological subversion." There followed a series of cant protests claiming that coexistence with

the West could not encompass "ideological coexistence" with imperialism.¹⁶

With regard to this question, as with regard to SALT II and MFR, events in the winter of 1973–1974 had a profound impact on the status of CSCE. First there was the Middle East war and the OPEC oil boycott. The Soviets seemed determined to take advantage of Western and American difficulties, although many of their particular actions—like the resupply and support of the Arab cause—can be understood in terms of Soviet national interests and long-standing Soviet policies, and do not have to be considered as particular aggravations of the détente relationship. But Soviet support of the Arabs melded with the issue of allowing Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, which issue had developed considerable emotional and political punch in the United States. The natural rivalry of interests between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East no doubt would have sharpened the crisis in any case, but because of the added emotional issue of emigration, Soviet policy began to be discussed in Washington as a cause for bringing the entire détente policy into question.

Second, probably on grounds unrelated to Middle East foreign policy and possibly on grounds unrelated to the "freer movement" in CSCE, the Soviet government expelled the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn in February, 1974. His depiction of the police state had been eloquently expressed in a book, *The Gulag Archipelago*, released in Paris shortly before. The whole issue of "freer movement" subsequently blended in the United States with the dramatic evidence of the repressive nature of Soviet society. And several highly emotional issues had become mixed with causes of rational concern about the United States/U.S.S.R. relationship: the Solzhenitsyn affair and the anti-Israeli Soviet stance, which was linked to Jewish emigration and to anti-Semitism in the Middle East war, seemed to dramatize the most unsavory aspects of Soviet communism, and these considerations became mixed with the challenge of conflicting United States and Soviet interests in the Middle East and of the new missile tests.

The mood toward détente in Washington had shifted perceptibly in a less favorable direction.

ORDERING MORAL VALUES

The mixture of SALT II, MFR and CSCE is potentially explosive. The stalemate in SALT II threatens to drive the strategic arms race up another twist in the spiral. Failing resolution of the SALT II issues, the United States may adopt new strategic programs—for example, the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine or modifications to MIRV—that may preclude a stable strategic balance for years to come. But the

¹⁵ *Pravda*, December 22, 1972, p. 1.

¹⁶ See the speech by M. A. Suslov to the All-Union Knowledge Society Congress, *Pravda*, June 21, 1972, p. 1, and the article by Yuri Zhukov, *Pravda*, January 5, 1973, p. 4.

Pentagon has kept these options alive in part to induce the Soviets to agree to a SALT II treaty, and the issue is whether the United States will accept strategic parity at the 7,000 level or whether political forces demanding numerical hedges will prevail. Even if strategic parity is defined and negotiated, the issue of conventional force balance in Europe will have to be settled almost simultaneously. For some of the systems on which that balance is calculated are inseparable from the ones in the strategic balance, and the credibility of the United States deterrent as a protection for its European allies against conventional attack may well be diluted once strategic parity of the kind contemplated in a 7,000-warhead environment is achieved.

The urgency that nearly simultaneous solutions be found for the inextricably intertwined issues of MFR and SALT II cannot easily be denied. But the solution of these complex issues is complicated by the political dimension of détente—one most apparent in CSCE. The issue there is whether the United States is prepared to coexist with the Soviet Union, many undesirable qualities of whose political system have been particularly dramatized this year by the Solzhenitsyn affair.

CONCLUSION

This political dimension of the détente issue suggests two principles:

1) As President Nixon argued in his address to the Annapolis graduates in June, 1974, we must moderate our foreign policy to fit our means.¹⁷ We may not like the Soviet political system, or some aspects of it, but we do not have the capability to change it by our actions.

2) The trouble with the contention (argued by the venerable Solzhenitsyn among others) that the West compromises its moral principles by dealing with the current repressive Soviet leadership and that it should withhold agreement on the extension of technology and trade, for example, to promote changes within the Soviet system, is that it contains an implicit ordering of moral values. Is it more humane to withhold trade and technology on the demand for "freer movement" of people and ideas or Jewish emigration, if by that action the United States delays or sacrifices a SALT II or MFR accord? That question requires a moral judgment, without any easy solution. But the stakes are high in SALT II and MFR, and a satisfactory conclusion to these negotiations represents a high moral purpose. It is in American interests to control the strategic bilateral environment and the multi-lateral conventional environment in Europe. A saner world arms environment constitutes the proper focus

of United States policy, the proper immediate goal of détente.

In the long term, each politico-economic system can address itself to the peaceful conversion of the other, but détente finds sufficient justification in the achievable. SALT II and MFR agreements should not be sacrificed for elusive, if desirable, goals like the alteration of the political system of the Soviet Union. To accept that goal, perhaps even in terms of "freer movement of peoples and ideas," is to regress toward the cold war and toward an incalculably more dangerous world. □

RECENT TRENDS IN SOVIET TRADE

(Continued from page 172)

(1) The U.S.S.R. will continue to expand its foreign trade and to establish new forms of industrial cooperation. Suggestive are small growing sales of Soviet technology in the West (e.g., Kivcet base metal smelters) and the beginning of Soviet-Western subcontracting (e.g., Soviet motors for installation in Rank Xerox copying machines).

(2) The U.S.S.R. will increasingly support world trade institutions. The U.S.S.R. participates in the Economic Commission for Europe and has joined the International Copyright Convention. Currently, it is seeking a dialogue between the Common Market and CMEA.

(3) The U.S.S.R. will get far less than it wants from the United States, where opposition to Soviet trade has prevented the application of non-discriminatory tariffs to Soviet goods, has halted further Export-Import Bank loans to the U.S.S.R., and has stalled proposals for joint development of Siberian natural gas. In response, the Soviet Union may seek goods and financing from other (mainly Western) sources.

(4) Despite deradicalization, at times other countries will find the Soviets exasperating and annoying to deal with on commercial questions. (This applies to any great power.)

(5) Soviet deradicalization does not imply convergence with the West. Although Soviet officials have from time to time considered breaking up the state monopoly of foreign trade, abolishing central planning, and decentralizing the economy, there is little hope for major changes of this sort in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the foreign trade institutions of the Soviet Union and the West will remain incompatible.

(6) A deradicalized Soviet Union will engage in piecemeal foreign-trade reform, retaining the basic structure of bureaucratic controls. Reforms that promise substantial savings when implemented include computerization of foreign trade offices and containerization of international transport facilities. □

¹⁷ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 10, 1974), pp. 575-580.

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

(Continued from page 149)

with the buildup and modernization of their own.²

It is difficult to state with any certainty the benefits to the United States. There is guarded optimism that the strategic arms race, though not ended or reversed, has been stabilized at a lower threshold of anxiety than would have been the case without the SALT agreements; and it is hoped that further agreements may lead to a decrease in onerous military budgets. Trade has increased, though the Soviets have yet to prove that they can sustain a solid trade relationship, because few of their exports have any interest to American importers. Finally, détente conforms to the dictates of American domestic politics. The American public is tired of overseas burdens: Vietnam has faded into obscurity, its lessons yet to be discussed nationally; the political-economic importance of West Europe is little appreciated; and the complex of Middle Eastern issues flared only briefly into the national consciousness mainly because of the shocking increase in the price of gasoline.

Public understanding of the political and moral issues involved in détente is limited. In the months and years ahead, a national debate on these questions may take place. One is certainly required. For the moment, students of United States-Soviet relations would do well to scrutinize the behavior of each power for clues to their aims and policies, to the core dilemmas and the dangers that cannot be conjured away by summits or speeches. ■

² According to an analyst who twice served as United States Air Force Attaché in Moscow, "Soviet active-duty forces are backed by reserves from two to three times larger than generally recognized, and greater than those of the United States by an order of magnitude. Faulty information about the size and organization of the Soviet armed forces may lead to inadequate force programming on our own part." Colonel William F. Scott (ret.), "Are We Underrating Soviet Military Manpower?" *Air Force Magazine*, vol. 57, no. 4 (April, 1974), p. 31.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

(Continued from page 163)

ternational tasks" by the Soviet Union and its allies in aid of them. Détente would continue, the officers

¹⁴ V. Serebriannikov and M. Iasiukov, "Mirnoe soshchestvovanie i zashchita sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, 1972, no. 16, pp. 9-16.

¹⁵ V. Ivanov, "Nauchnye printsipy rukovodstva zashchitoi sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva," *ibid.*, 1969, no. 16, p. 12.

¹⁶ E. Rybkin, "Leninskaiia kontseptsia voiny i sovremenost'," *ibid.*, 1973, no. 20, pp. 26-27.

argued, only if the Soviets dealt with the West from a position of strength. This was not a process of mutual accommodation but a process in which the Soviet Union was successfully "forcing them [the imperialists] to peace." The authors pointed out the implications for the army's claim to resources. "Imperialism reckons only with force, and this immutable fact retains its significance. A unilateral slackening in defense power by the U.S.S.R. might call forth sharp changes in the policy of the ruling circles of the imperialist states." Détente would bear fruit only if the Soviet Union increased its military capabilities. "Life dictates the need for unflagging concern for strengthening the defense capability of the socialist Fatherland, the military might of the Soviet armed forces."¹⁴

Strong military articulations of policy preference can also be traced on a number of other issues. A list of the most prominent issues would include the following:

(1) The military demands a "rational" or "scientific" approach to military policy making. It stresses the importance of deference by national leaders to military advice and expertise.

The more the political leadership relies on the conclusions reached by military science, the more effective its decisions will be, the more the unity of political and military leadership will be attained. Lenin often stressed the importance of specialized knowledge and the role of specialists in leading any cause, including the defense of the country.¹⁵

(2) The army wants cooperation from non-military sectors of the Soviet economy and society in the interests of national defense. Specifically, it seeks: greater efficiency and adaptability from Soviet defense industry and research institutions, as well as greater political and financial support for these organizations; more emphasis by planners on building up Soviet reserves of defense-related materials and dispersing productive facilities to minimize the impact of an enemy nuclear strike; more attention to civil defense; and greater attentiveness by local party and government authorities to the housing and services needs of Soviet soldiers.

(3) The army wants acknowledgment of its continued viability and indispensability as an instrument of foreign policy. Military spokesmen insist that "no changes of principle have taken place in the relationship between war and policy" since the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and stress that denial of this truth "may lead to a blunting of class and defense vigilance."¹⁶ In recent years, military spokesmen have also increasingly emphasized the necessity of preparation for contained local wars, fought (in theory, at the initiative of the West) by conventional means.

(4) The army seeks an open-ended commitment by national leaders to pursue all available avenues of weapons development. It is presumably such a desire

to develop MIRV technology that hardened the Soviet position in the latest round of SALT talks. The Soviet military sees weapons' innovation as a never-ending dialectic spurred on by both enemy capabilities and the push of "technological imperatives." "The supply of technology cannot stand still, any more than the development of the military art can. This is especially true now, when there is stormy renewal and perfection in all spheres of human activity, including military affairs."¹⁷

(5) The army also wants the propagation, by all available means, of military and "military-patriotic" values—in an increasingly complex society that has not gone to war in a generation. Military leaders frequently demand greater coverage of military themes in the Soviet media, criticize artists, other intellectuals, and even official agencies for insufficient respect for military ideals, and organize public relations projects designed to improve the military's image, especially in the eyes of Soviet youth.

Clearly, these expressions of opinion and the policies to which they are addressed are important. Yet it is also clear that individual policy questions must be evaluated in the context of ongoing stability in the army-party relationship. Barring unforeseen developments, the Soviet military establishment is unlikely to pose any major challenge to existing political arrangements. Its political participation is confined within reasonably clear limits, and it shows no signs of overflowing them and inaugurating an era of praetorianism or even the kind of military guardianship that characterizes Mao's China. The Soviet military is a discreet and powerful organization, with its own values and interests. But it is also an integral part of an established political order that shows no evidence of decay or major reform. □

¹⁷ A. Milovidov, "Leninizm—ideinaia osnova politiki KPSS," *ibid.*, 1971, no. 18, p. 17.

SOVIET POLITICS

(Continued from page 159)

of the "new Soviet man" has been largely emptied of its anarchistic content and has become a prescription for a nondescript secular morality attuned to the pressures for compliance on "organization men" and the popular demand for social peace. This ideological revisionism accords more closely with the realities of Soviet society than the earlier revolutionary model, and it explains more adequately the growing centrality of the party's role. But it remains to be seen whether this increasing emphasis upon a revised ideology can

²⁴ See John A. Armstrong, *Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union*, 3d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), ch. 4.

provide the value commitment to energize the processes of modernization and integration.

The party, particularly the apparatus, has augmented its elite status during the Brezhnev years. Generally greater security for mid-level elites has produced pronounced increments in intra-party cohesion, but security has had its price: political initiative "from below" is discouraged in an apparatus that resembles an American corporate giant more than a revolutionary party. Efficiency at the lower levels is encouraged by advances in technological training of cadres and by the "permanent purge," which is accentuated by the exchange of party cards, scheduled for completion by the end of this year. But the leadership is aging, and the mobility of younger cadres has been impeded. More than 55 percent of the Central Committee members are over 60 years of age; only ten percent are below 50.²⁴ When Brezhnev passes from the political scene, he probably will be replaced by a leader or leaders heavily committed to his policy orientation. But the new leadership will be dependent upon younger lieutenants who are now victims of intra-party "immobilism"; these men will have more technical expertise than their predecessors but much less political experience in positions of high responsibility.

It is significant that the Communist party of the Soviet Union has expanded its central role in Soviet society during the confrontation with the serious internal problems of the early 1970's. Given the absence of structural alternatives, growth of this central role is likely to continue; even severe systemic crises would have to be resolved through the party mechanism. However, the Brezhnevian pattern of social control has concealed and abetted a very real immobilism, both political and economic, in Soviet society. A heavy price may be exacted in the future for the absence of more radical and more effective solutions to persistent general problems. But one must also take account of the relationship between domestic and foreign politics. Despite United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's spectacular diplomacy, the reality of Soviet power in world politics becomes steadily more impressive. If the Soviet Union emerges, perhaps by default, as the world's greatest superpower, this will have a decisive impact on domestic stabilization, and Brezhnev's conservative leadership will be largely vindicated. □

CONTEMPORARY SOVIET SOCIETY

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for advancement, education, access to housing, permission to live in the desirable cities—all these may be jeopardized by opposition to the regime. In addition, the political dissenter still risks exile or imprisonment.

Soviet dissidents are the first to admit that they

enjoy little mass support in their own country. Dissent is concentrated among artists, writers, and other intellectuals. There are, no doubt, Soviet citizens who secretly admire the dissidents. Many others consider them traitors, especially those who give statements to the Western press. The regime has had some success in isolating dissidents through the mobilization of chauvinism, xenophobia, and, on occasion, anti-Semitism.

Perhaps the most widespread view of the dissidents is that they are beating their heads against the Kremlin wall. For the majority of Soviet citizens the regime is simply a fact of life, like the weather. To them, a demonstration against the government must appear as unreasonable as a picket line to protest the cold Moscow winter.

THE FUTURE

Soviet society is experiencing many of the changes common to industrializing societies. Soviet political institutions, on the other hand, seem remarkably resistant to change. The Soviet citizen enjoys more education, better health care, and a higher standard of living than ever before. Yet he is as far as ever from enjoying a free press or a free election.

Will social change lead eventually to political change, or will the economic success of the U.S.S.R. serve merely to consolidate the position of the self-perpetuating leadership? The answer lies in the years ahead. ■

THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN A WORLD OF SHORTAGES

(Continued from page 168)

the Russians will be able to substitute the export of industrialized products for the export of raw materials.

Yet as long as the Russians have raw materials to

export and do not have to enter world markets as buyers of raw materials themselves (for example, as the buyer of large quantities of wheat in 1972), the Russians will be in a good economic position. Today, it is an advantage to have large stocks of unexploited raw materials. Whereas this used to be a sign of weakness, now it is a measure of political power and economic strength. Being unable to produce sophisticated machinery may no longer be so embarrassing. Even if allowance is made for the growth of Soviet domestic consumption, and for the fact that the Soviet Union may find itself with less of a surplus to export, the Soviet Union still comes out ahead because of the significantly higher prices the materials command per pound of output.

The Soviet Union has large quantities of raw materials and today that is an advantage. If they sell them, they can obtain foreign technology. Even if they decide to use their raw materials inside the U.S.S.R., they will still be in an advantageous position. It is true that industrial productivity is higher in Japan and West Europe, but this advantage will be offset by the higher prices the Japanese and West Europeans must henceforth pay for their imported raw materials. Thus, when they sell their goods, the Russians have a cost advantage that they previously lacked. Presumably, this will tend to make Soviet products more competitive on the world market than was the case previously, even when allowance is made for the lower productivity of Soviet labor and capital. If Soviet planners find that the cost of not selling raw materials is still too high to ignore, they can sell their raw materials and bring in foreign equipment or finished foreign products instead. The Russians now have that choice. Until 1973, their bargaining power was relatively modest. This is no longer true. More than anything else, that is the significance of the raw materials crisis for the U.S.S.R. ■

Table III: Soviet Machinery Trade with Selected Countries (\$ millions)

	England		France		Germany		Italy		Japan		United States	
	X	M	X	M	X	M	X	M	X	M	X	M
1958	—	18	—	13	—	41	—	7	—	3	—	1
1959	—	44	—	39	—	39	1	11	—	11	—	7
1960	—	58	1	63	1	96	1	30	—	19	—	28
1961	—	77	1	69	1	91	1	43	1	29	—	16
1962	—	62	1	88	—	59	1	33	2	77	—	20
1963	1	64	1	33	1	73	1	80	2	86	—	1
1964	1	47	2	42	2	134	1	52	3	133	—	4
1965	1	70	2	28	2	71	1	39	2	73	—	6
1966	2	102	3	55	2	98	1	38	1	106	—	7
1967	3	93	5	101	5	60	4	83	2	66	—	8
1968	7	134	5	193	9	103	6	110	2	65	—	9
1969	2	125	5	183	5	172	4	200	4	75	—	38
1970	5	110	7	174	28	136	5	196	3	122	—	24
1971	5	95	7	173	15	182	3	151	6	140	—	29
1972	10	108	10	160	20	367	6	146	6	241	1	58

Source: From annual issues of VT SSSR. (Rate of exchange prior to 1972 is \$1.11 = 1 ruble. In 1972 it is \$1.213 to 1 ruble.)

BOOKS

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activist interest, its considerable commitments and expenditures, and the price that a superpower must pay to follow a global policy. This is a useful study of an important theme. A.Z.R.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST: THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA. EDITED BY IVO J. LEDERER AND WAYNE S. VUCINICH. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974. 302 pages, index, \$9.95.)

This is an uneven, disappointing collection of essays, originally prepared in 1969 and, in most cases, not brought closer to the present period. Two essays give overviews of Russian and Soviet interest in the area; there are solid contributions on the U.S.S.R. and North Africa and on Soviet writings on the Middle East; those dealing with Iran, Israel, and Egypt are thin, covering familiar ground.

A.Z.R.

CHURCH, STATE AND OPPOSITION IN THE U.S.S.R. BY GERHARD SIMON. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974. 248 pages, documents, select bibliography, index, \$12.00.)

In recent months much attention in the West has focused on leading Soviet dissident intellectuals, such as Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. Far less is known of the persistent religious groups and movements in the Soviet Union, despite decades of persecution and harassment.

This study, ably translated from German, provides a great deal of fascinating information about the plight of the churches in the U.S.S.R. Two chapters describe the Russian church on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution. The heart of the book is the three chapters on church-state relations and religious persecution today. The documents are translations from Russian of underground reports and information on the precarious situation of religious individuals and groups. A.Z.R.

ST. PETERSBURG AND MOSCOW: TSARIST AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1814-1974. BY BARBARA JELAVICH. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1974. 480 pages, suggested references and index, \$12.50 cl.; \$4.95 paper.)

This study "presents a survey of Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy from the Congress of Vienna, 1814, to 1974." Of the ten chapters, six deal with the Tsarist period, and one each on the Lenin, Stalin,

Khrushchev, and Brezhnev periods. Containing a wealth of information, well organized, and developed in balanced, insightful manner, this work should find warm welcome in the marketplace of undergraduate textbooks. A.Z.R.

STRATEGY FOR THE WEST: AMERICAN ALLIED RELATIONS IN TRANSITION. EDITED BY RICHARD B. FOSTER, ANDRÉ BEAUFRE, AND WYNFRED JOSHUA. (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1974. 258 pages, appendices, index, \$11.00.)

This series of essays is devoted to an examination of the nature of the Soviet threat to Europe and the United States and the different ways of responding to it. It is useful background for the East-West negotiations currently in progress. The contributors, Americans and Europeans, are recognized authorities on strategy, foreign policy, and the problems facing NATO. A.Z.R.

THE RUSSIAN DILEMMA: A POLITICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL VIEW. BY ROBERT G. WESSON. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1974. 228 pages and index, \$12.50.)

The author of this political interpretation of Russian and Soviet history offers a compelling synthesis that explains Muscovite expansionism in terms of spatial politics, ethnic tensions, and an accepted tradition of despotic rule. Professor Wesson makes understandable the many contradictions that have shaped the Russian system.

The thesis unfolds with remarkable clarity. Wesson notes that "the Soviet system is held the more tightly by the fear that yielding anything means endangering all." While dissolution seems improbable, decay and stagnation are not, because of the innate conservatism of the ruling elite. Yet, as the U.S.S.R. becomes more enmeshed with the non-Communist world, unanticipated catalysts may make for a greater mellowing. A.Z.R.

COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF THE THIRD WORLD. BY EDWARD TABORSKY. (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, Publishers, 1973. 500 pages, bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

Soviet interest in the third world has been a prominent feature of Kremlin policy for more than two decades. The origins, aims, and characteristics of this "forward policy" are explored in this study. Professor Taborsky devotes considerable attention to the ideological determinants of Soviet (and Chinese) policy; to the role of foreign Communist parties; to the economic dimensions; and to cultural diplomacy. A.Z.R. □

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of August, 1974, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Cyprus Crisis

(See also *Intl, U.N.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 4—Cypriote President Glafkos Clerides protests to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim that the Turks have expelled 20,000 Greek Cypriotes from the Turkish sector between Nicosia and Kyrenia.

Aug. 8—President Clerides announces the formation of a new Cabinet. He will retain for himself the posts of foreign affairs and interior.

In Geneva, the 2d phase of talks among the foreign ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Britain begins.

Aug. 12—Greek Cypriote National Guardsmen continue to withdraw from 4 Turkish Cypriote villages held since the July 20th Turkish invasion.

Turkish representatives in Geneva propose that Cyprus be divided into separate communities or "cantons" under Turkish Cypriote or Greek Cypriote control. The Turks withdraw their proposal that Cyprus be divided into 2 equal separate states. Cypriote leader Clerides claims the new proposal is "unacceptable."

Aug. 13—Greece and Cyprus ask for 24 to 48 hours in order to consult with their governments before answering the Turkish proposal. The Turks reject the request. The Geneva talks end.

Aug. 14—Greece withdraws her troops from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). She will remain only in the political section of the alliance. Greece claims she is withdrawing because NATO did not prevent the Turks from invading Cyprus.

The new administration of U.S. President Gerald Ford calls for an immediate cease-fire in Cyprus and a resumption of the Geneva peace talks. The U.S. warns both Greece and Turkey that if there is fighting neither country will be supplied with American military supplies.

The Turks begin a major offensive by air and ground attack. Nicosia is under air attack. A cease-fire is arranged for Nicosia at the urging of the U.N. Security Council.

Aug. 15—Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus are informed by the U.S. that it is willing to play an active role in mediating the present crisis.

Greek Premier Constantine Caramanlis announces a decision not to go to war on Cyprus against the Turks.

Aug. 16—Turkish forces continue a drive across northern Cyprus, cutting the island in two. Thousands of Greek Cypriotes flee their villages. The Turks call for a cease-fire.

Greek Premier Caramanlis rejects the Turkish proposal for a resumption of peace talks in Geneva and refuses an invitation to discuss the Cyprus situation with President Ford in Washington.

Aug. 17—Turkish forces violate the cease-fire and move southward, cutting off the north-south highways.

Aug. 19—U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger P. Davies is killed during a Greek Cypriote demonstration outside the embassy.

Aug. 22—Cypriote President Glafkos Clerides, a Greek, and Cypriote Vice President Rauf Denktash, a Turk, agree to meet for the first time since Turkey's invasion.

The Soviet Union asks for a 15-member U.N. Security Council meeting (including Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus) on the question of Cyprus to replace the Geneva conference.

Aug. 23—Cypriote President Clerides and Greek leaders, meeting in Athens, agree that there will be no peace talks with regard to Cyprus until Turkish troops return to their positions of August 9.

Aug. 26—U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim confers separately and then jointly with President Clerides and Vice President Rauf Denktash.

Aug. 27—The Turkish Foreign Ministry makes public a statement in which Turkey rejects a Soviet proposal for an expanded Cyprus peace conference, and calls on Greece to resume peace negotiations at Geneva.

Clerides accepts the Soviet proposal for an enlarged peace conference on Cyprus.

European Economic Community (EEC)

(See also *France*.)

Aug. 1—EEC Commissioner for Agriculture Pierre Lardinois says that French and Belgian farmers have apparently been given an unfair advantage over other EEC-country farmers; France and Belgium give direct aid to their meat-producing farmers.

International Court of Justice (World Court)

(See *Australia*.)

Middle East

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Crisis; France; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Aug. 1—Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon says that Israel is ready to negotiate with Jordan as part of a concerted effort toward peace in the Middle East. Israel previously insisted that the next stage of talks involve Israel and Egypt.
- Aug. 2—Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres accuses Egypt of violating the troop disengagement agreement along the Suez Canal.
- Aug. 7—Israeli planes bomb terrorist targets in southeastern Lebanon in retaliation for the recent kidnapping of 4 Israeli villagers from the Israeli-held section of the Golan Heights.
- Aug. 27—Combating increased guerrilla activities, Israeli authorities announce that 7 infiltrators from Jordan have been arrested since August 24.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See *Intl, Cyprus Crisis; Greece*)

Organization of American States (OAS)

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

United Nations

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Crisis; Portugal*)

- Aug. 1—The Security Council votes to increase the responsibilities of its peace-keeping force on Cyprus.
- Aug. 12—The Security Council votes unanimously to recommend that Guinea-Bissau be admitted to the U.N.
- Aug. 21—On the 3d day of the United Nations World Population Conference meeting of 135 nations in Bucharest, China and the U.S.S.R. charge that Western concern with overpopulation is an "imperialist myth" to subjugate developing countries.
- Aug. 29—Representatives from 150 nations end the 3d U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. More than 100 issues have been discussed but no agreement has been reached.
- Aug. 30—The World Population Conference closes with a suggestion that world population growth should be substantially slowed by 1985.

War in Indochina

- Aug. 5—Heavy fighting continues around South Vietnamese government outposts along the coast south of Danang.
- Aug. 6—A spokesman for the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary government of South Vietnam charges that American pilots are carrying out air strikes over Communist-held territory north of Saigon.

ARGENTINA

- Aug. 1—A member of the Chamber of Deputies, Rodolfo Ortega Peña, is assassinated. He was a leading left-wing Peronist.
- Aug. 11—5 people are killed and 2 kidnapped by a left-wing guerrilla group in the central part of the country.
- Aug. 12—President Isabel Martinez de Peron's 8-member Cabinet resigns.
- Aug. 14—President Peron replaces 2 Cabinet ministers: defense, and interior and education.
- Aug. 28—*Noticias*, the only newspaper of the Peronist-left radical group, is closed by the government.

AUSTRALIA

- Aug. 25—Foreign Minister Donald R. Willesee claims the French have detonated their 7th nuclear explosion in a controversial series of atmospheric tests in the Pacific. Australia has complained to the International Court of Justice because of the fallout.

BANGLADESH

- Aug. 9—Extensive flooding is reported in 18 of the nation's 19 districts, killing 800 people and leaving 5 million homeless.

BELGIUM

(See *Intl, EEC*)

CANADA

- Aug. 2—A joint statement is issued by high level Canadian and Indian officials stating that they have been unable to reach agreement over India's nuclear explosion last May in which material supplied by Canada was used.
- Aug. 8—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau dismisses 5 ministers, moves 8, and adds 4 to his Cabinet. Mitchell W. Sharp, Minister of External Affairs for the last 6 years, becomes 2d to the Prime Minister in Cabinet seniority.
- Aug. 14—The leader of the opposition, Robert L. Stanfield, announces that he will resign as head of the Progressive Conservative party and that he will not run in the next federal election.
- Aug. 19—Ojibway (American) Indians, who have been occupying by force a 14-acre park since January 22, agree to begin discussions with officials. The Indians claim the park was illegally sold by the Department of Indian Affairs. They demand social reforms for the 7,000 Indians living in the Kenora area.

CUBA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Aug. 16—Joaquin Balaguer is sworn in for his 3d consecutive term as President.

EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East; France; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 18—Libyan leader Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi and President Anwar Sadat meet in an attempt to settle their dispute, which erupted over the proposed Egyptian-Libyan merger, after the Arab-Israeli war last October.

Aug. 28—President Sadat tells Alexandria newspaper editors that he has asked Deputy Premier Abdel Aziz Hegazi to prepare "a transitional 18-month development plan" that will permit him to resign the premiership he assumed when he assumed the presidency.

ETHIOPIA

Aug. 3—Emperor Haile Selassie accepts the 17-member Cabinet appointed by the new Premier, Mikael Imru. Most Cabinet members who served under former Premier Endalkachew Makonnen have been reappointed.

Aug. 16—The armed forces committee announces that it has abolished the Emperor's crown council, the court of justice, and the military committee.

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, EEC; Australia*)

Aug. 2—French and Dutch farmers protest falling agricultural prices in the Common Market.

Aug. 7—The government announces that it will review its Middle East arms sales policy. The statement comes as a result of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's revelation that French-built Mirage fighter-bombers sold to Libya were used in Egypt during last year's Arab-Israeli war. Under the 1969 French contract with Libya, deliveries can be stopped if Libya uses the planes outside the country.

Aug. 28—Official sources report that France will lift her embargo on arms sales to Middle East "battlefield" countries. France will sell arms to Israel as well as to Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Libya and other Arab countries without any restrictions.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *Italy*)

Aug. 23—Bankhaus Wolff of Hamburg closes its doors, the 4th West German bank to do so in the last 2 months. "Personal grounds" are given as the reason by the owners.

Aug. 27—The license of Frankfurter Handelsbank, A.G., is withdrawn preceding its closure by the Banking Supervisory Board.

GREECE

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 1—Premier Constantine Caramanlis announces the restoration of the 1952 constitution. Legislative power will be held by the Cabinet. The present government has the right to rule by decree until a constituent assembly is held. Either a referendum or the constituent assembly will decide whether to recall exiled King Constantine. No date is set for elections or for ending martial law.

Aug. 3—A former economics minister, Panayotis Papaligouras, is appointed to head the Bank of Greece. His appointment is one of a series of steps replacing military officials with civilians.

Aug. 13—U.S. Ambassador to Greece Henry J. Tasca is replaced (pending U.S. Senate confirmation) by Jack B. Kubisch. Under Tasca's ambassadorship, the U.S. government strongly supported the military dictatorship that ruled the country for the last 7 years.

Aug. 19—The government returns to civilian officials the ultimate control over military transfers and promotions.

Aug. 30—Greece sends notes to the U.S. and other NATO nations requesting discussions on the future of foreign military bases in Greece.

ICELAND

Aug. 27—Members of the Farmers' Progressive party and the Independence party form a coalition government. They had been stalemated for the 7 weeks since the general election. Independent party leader Geir Hallgrimsson becomes Premier.

INDIA

(See also *Canada*)

Aug. 9—Extensive flooding, the worst in 20 years, is reported in 7 of the nation's 20 states, with extensive damage to property and heavy loss of life.

Aug. 11—It is reported that the 15-year-old Swatantra (Freedom) party has dissolved and merged with an 11-party coalition in opposition to the Congress party.

Aug. 18—National elections are held for the presidency.

Aug. 21—Election results indicate that Congress party candidate Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed has been elected president, with more than 67 percent of the vote.

IRAN

(See also *U.S., Legislation*)

Aug. 14—U.S. Congressman Otis Pike (D., N.Y.) reveals that the Iranian government has offered to lend money to the Grumman Corporation to ensure the continued production of the F-14 fighter plane; Iran has a number of the planes on order

from Grumman. Iranian aid for Grumman would have to be approved by the U.S. State Department.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East; France*)

Aug. 15—Parliament authorizes Premier Yitzhak Rabin to hold peace talks with Jordan over the future of the West Bank of Jordan. The vote to delay a national referendum on the West Bank allows the Israelis to negotiate on the basis of a possible territorial compromise.

Aug. 23—Military officials report that Israel plans to go ahead with a 24-hour call-up for practice mobilization of thousands of reservists, despite anxiety expressed in the Arab world.

Aug. 26—The Israeli practice mobilization of military reserves ends 2 hours ahead of schedule because of the smoothness of the operation.

ITALY

Aug. 31—Premier Mariano Rumor and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt announce that West Germany will give Italy a \$2-billion credit because of Italy's financial crisis.

JAPAN

Aug. 30—In Tokyo at the main offices of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, a bomb explodes, killing 8 people and injuring at least 330. Police suspect that ultraleftist radicals are responsible.

JORDAN

(See *Intl, Middle East; France; Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Aug. 1—A group representing two-thirds of the nation's 3.4 million Protestants demands that President Park Chung Hee withdraw the emergency decrees suppressing dissent.

Aug. 6—Premier Kim Jong Pil rejects the demands of the Protestant group. It threatens to stage a major protest in Seoul within 2 weeks.

Aug. 8—The Ministry of National Defense announces that 26 persons have been convicted of subversion and 79 others are being placed on trial.

Aug. 12—Former President Yun Po Sun and a Roman Catholic bishop are among those sentenced by a court martial. Yun is given a suspended sentence but the bishop is sentenced to 15 years in jail.

Aug. 14—36 more people are sentenced to prison terms. 194 have been convicted of attempting to overthrow the government.

Aug. 15—The wife of President Park is killed in an attempt to assassinate the President as he addresses a Liberation Day audience.

LAOS

Aug. 6—Premier Souvanna Phouma designates the top Communist Cabinet member, Deputy Premier Phoumi Vongvichit, to serve as acting Premier while he recuperates from his heart attack.

LIBYA

(See *Egypt; France*)

MALAYSIA

Aug. 25—It is reported from Kuala Lumpur that the National Front coalition government of Prime Minister Abdul Razak won a landslide victory in yesterday's election. According to fairly complete returns, the government front appears to have won control of nearly 90 percent of the seats in Parliament and equally large majorities in state assembly elections.

MEXICO

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 28—The Mexican police report that the 83-year-old father-in-law of Mexican President Luis Echeverría, J. Guadalupe Zuno Hernandez, has been kidnapped by a band of terrorists. He was abducted from his car.

Aug. 29—The government announces that it will refuse to bargain with the kidnappers of President Echeverría's father-in-law.

NEW ZEALAND

Aug. 31—Prime Minister Norman E. Kirk dies of a heart seizure.

PERU

Aug. 16—The government newspaper *La Crónica* reports the arrest of 8 leaders of the opposition Acción Popular party for allegedly attempting to "create chaos" in Peru.

PHILIPPINES

Aug. 28—The Philippine Defense Department announces that 57 people have been arrested in the last 3 months in a continued government crack-down on underground Communist units engaged in the manufacture of explosives and the smuggling of arms.

PORTUGAL

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Aug. 2—U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim arrives for talks on Portugal's plans to decolonize her African territories.

The junta headed by President António de Spínola suspends publication of 3 daily newspapers for reporting on Maoist demonstrations against the African wars.

Aug. 3—President Spínola rescinds the order suspending publication of the 3 newspapers. Other newspapers and radio stations threatened to strike if the papers were not permitted to publish.

Aug. 4—U.N. Secretary General Waldheim announces that Portugal is prepared to support the liberation of Portuguese Guinea and work for its entry into the United Nations.

Aug. 5—The military leaders suspend indefinitely the radical leftist weekly *Luta Popular*.

Portuguese Territories

ANGOLA

Aug. 8—*The New York Times* reports that thousands of blacks and whites are fleeing Luanda's suburbs. Over the last 3 days, 18 people have been killed and 122 wounded in fighting between rival nationalist groups.

Aug. 10—The Portuguese government publishes a 2-year plan for granting independence to Angola. The leading liberation movement rejects the part of the proposal calling for a provisional government after a cease-fire is achieved.

PORTUGUESE GUINEA

Aug. 8—Foreign Minister Mario Soares goes to Algiers for the final phase of talks leading to Guinean independence. The Portuguese government maintains that the Cape Verde Islands, which according to the liberation forces should be freed with Guinea, cannot be granted independence simultaneously with Guinea. The Portuguese threaten to withdraw all their forces from Guinea if there is no agreement on the Cape Verde Islands.

Aug. 26—Foreign Minister Soares and the Deputy Defense Minister of the self-proclaimed Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Pedro Piro, sign an agreement in Algiers granting independence to Portuguese Guinea (Guinea-Bissau) on September 10. A referendum will be held at some future time on the fate of the Cape Verde Islands. All Portuguese troops will be removed by October 31.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

SPAIN

Aug. 9—Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón presides over his first Cabinet meeting as acting Chief of State. Generalissimo Francisco Franco is recuperating from phlebitis.

SRI LANKA

Aug. 26—The nationalization of 600,000 acres of privately owned land is completed by the Socialist coalition government, pursuant to a land reform law passed in 1972.

SYRIA

(See *France; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

TURKEY

(See *Intl, Cyprus Crisis*)

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Crisis, Middle East*)

Aug. 5—The government newspaper *Izvestia* reports that Secretary General Leonid I. Brezhnev has held a series of informal meetings with the leaders of East European nations.

Aug. 27—The Soviet news agency Tass reports the successful launching of the 15th spacecraft in the Soyuz series.

Aug. 28—Spaceship Soyuz 15 and its 2-man crew return abruptly and safely to earth after only 2 days in space, according to Tass.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See *Intl, Cyprus Crisis*)

UNITED STATES

Administration

(See also *U.S., Impeachment Proceedings, Political Scandal*)

Aug. 8—President Richard M. Nixon announces that he will resign from office, effective at noon August 9. Without mentioning his possible impeachment or his role in the Watergate cover-up, he says that: "In the past few days it was evident I no longer had a strong enough political base in Congress to continue with the effort."

Vice President Gerald R. Ford says that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger will remain in his post. Aug. 9—President Nixon submits his letter of resignation to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. He leaves for San Clemente.

Vice President Gerald R. Ford is sworn in as the 38th President.

President Ford names a 4-member committee of former elected officials to oversee and make recommendations for the transition of power from the Nixon administration, including staff changes. The 4 men are William Scranton, Donald Rumsfeld, Rogers C. B. Morton, and John O. Marsh.

President Ford introduces his new press secretary, J. F. terHorst.

J. F. terHorst reveals the appointment of Robert T. Hartman, President Ford's vice presidential Chief of Staff, as counselor to the President.

Aug. 10—At a meeting of the full Cabinet, President Ford asks all Cabinet members and the heads of

government agencies to remain in office in the name of "continuity and stability."

Aug. 12—President Ford addresses a joint session of Congress.

Aug. 15—Philip W. Buchen, a former law partner of President Ford's, becomes the President's counsel in charge of all legal matters; the White House announces the resignation of J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr., the last of former President Nixon's legal staff associated with Watergate to resign.

Aug. 16—J. F. terHorst announces that all of former President Nixon's tape recordings and documents will remain in the possession of the White House until the Watergate investigation ends.

Aug. 17—*The New York Times* reports that on August 9, the day President Nixon resigned, Nixon changed the status of his gift of pre-presidential papers to the National Archives. Under the change, no one will have access to the papers until 1985 without his personal permission.

Aug. 19—In a speech to the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, President Ford supports "leniency" for military draft evaders and deserters.

Aug. 20—Former New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller is named by President Ford to be the 41st Vice President. The nomination must be confirmed by a simple majority vote in both houses of Congress.

Aug. 28—President Ford holds his first news conference since becoming President and indicates in response to questions that he is still keeping his options open with regard to some form of leniency for former President Nixon but not before legal processes are undertaken.

Aug. 29—President Ford asks Congress to appropriate \$850,000 to help former President Nixon over the transitional period and to meet his pension costs and other expenses between now and June 30, 1975.

Economy

Aug. 2—The Treasury Department places a 9 percent interest rate on \$4-billion worth of notes. The rate is the highest ever offered on Treasury securities with a maturity of more than 1 year. The notes can be purchased in denominations as low as \$1,000.

The Labor Department reports the unemployment rate at 5.3 percent for the month of July.

Aug. 12—President Ford criticizes the 10-percent increase announced by the General Motors Corporation for 1975 cars.

The Department of Agriculture announces a 12-percent drop in this year's corn crop over last year's crop. The early spring rains followed by the summer drought have seriously affected the crops.

Aug. 16—The Commerce Department reports that

the start of housing construction for July was the lowest in 4 years.

Aug. 21—Because of criticism from the President, the General Motors Corporation announces that it will lower its previously announced 9.5-percent price increase on 1975 model cars and trucks to 8.5 percent; the average car or truck will increase in cost some \$426, \$54 less than previously planned.

Aug. 26—White House press secretary J. F. terHorst announces that the President has 5 goals for his summit conference on inflation that will be held in Washington, September 27–28. The conference will be preceded by a series of preliminary meetings with President Ford acting as chairman of 2 of them.

Aug. 27—Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon indicates to reporters that the Ford administration is inclined toward a further \$2-billion cut in the current federal budget for fiscal 1975 to a \$298-billion level.

The Dow Jones industrial index declines to 671.54; its lowest level in 4 years.

Aug. 28—At his news conference, President Gerald Ford states that he can "foresee no circumstances under which I can see the reimposition of wage and price controls" as a curb to inflation.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Crisis; Greece*)

Aug. 1—*The New York Times* reports that the Nixon administration has told the Central Intelligence Agency "not to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece. . . ."

Aug. 7—U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Joseph John Jova rejects the Mexican government's proposal to renew the seasonal migrant workers' agreement. It was revoked in 1964 at the behest of the American labor movement.

Aug. 9—President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger begin meetings with foreign envoys, reaffirming former President Richard Nixon's foreign policy objectives.

Aug. 11—Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy arrives for talks with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger.

Aug. 16—King Hussein of Jordan meets with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger in Washington.

Aug. 19—The U.S. agrees to provide Egypt with \$16.5 million in wheat (100,000 tons) before October 1. The wheat is being sold to Egypt under the P.L. 480 program, which provides for long-term, low interest rates.

Aug. 23—The President confers with Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam in Washington, D.C.

Aug. 26—William R. Crawford, Jr., is sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, replacing the slain Rodger P. Davies.

Aug. 28—Responding to a question at his news conference, President Ford indicates that the U.S. will act in concert with the other members of the Organization of American States in any moves that group agrees upon to improve relations with Cuba.

Secretary of State Kissinger meets in Washington with Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Omar Saqqaf for 2 days of talks.

Impeachment Proceedings

(See also *U.S., Administration, Political Scandal*)

Aug. 20—The House of Representatives formally ends its inquiry into the possible impeachment of former President Richard M. Nixon without debating articles of impeachment. The House Judiciary Committee's privileged report on its inquiry pursuant to House Resolution 803 is referred to the calendar and ordered to be printed. 3 Representatives oppose the resolution.

Aug. 22—The 528-page impeachment report of the House Judiciary Committee is published, detailing the "clear and convincing evidence" that led the committee to recommend the impeachment of Richard M. Nixon.

Labor and Industry

Aug. 19—The United Mine Workers of America begin a week-long nationwide mine shutdown, theoretically to memorialize the 100,000 miners who have died in the last century in mine-related deaths. The strike supports the 13-month-old strike against the Duke Power Company, North Carolina's electric power combine.

Aug. 29—The United Mine Workers and the Eastover Mining Company, a subsidiary of the Duke Power Company, reach agreement on a contract. This is the first contract negotiated by the UMW for Eastover miners since the 1960's. The Southern Labor Union has represented the miners during the last decade.

Legislation

(See also *Iran*)

Aug. 5—President Nixon signs a \$22.2-billion military bill authorizing money for U.S. defense projects and funds to pay for military aircraft for South Vietnam.

Aug. 13—The Senate rejects a loan agreement that would allow the Pentagon to loan the Grumman Corporation up to \$100 million for the continued production of the F-14 fighter plane.

Aug. 14—President Ford signs a bill permitting American citizens to buy and sell gold, effective December 31, 1974.

Aug. 22—Voting 85 to 0, the Senate completes congressional action on a pension reform bill that sets standards for private pension plans and protects the

pension rights of some 30 million American workers.

Congress adjourns for a Labor Day recess; the Senate will reconvene September 4 and the House will reconvene September 11.

The President signs the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974; the act authorizes funding of \$11.3 billion over a 3-year period, provides significant assistance to home buyers and home builders, and gives communities more flexibility and control over housing programs in low-income areas. This is the first omnibus housing and community development act since 1968.

Aug. 24—The President signs a bill setting up an advisory Council on Wage and Price Stability to monitor wages and prices.

Political Scandal

(See also *U.S., Administration, Impeachment Proceedings*)

Aug. 1—California Lieutenant Governor Ed Reinecke promises to resign voluntarily. He was convicted last month of lying to the Senate Judiciary Committee about conversations he held with the then U.S. Attorney General, John Mitchell, with regard to the Republican national convention of 1972.

U.S. District Court Chief Judge George L. Hart, Jr., imposes a \$35,000 fine on the Associated Milk Producers, Inc. The association pleaded guilty of conspiring and making illegal campaign contributions in 1968, 1970, and 1972.

Aug. 2—Former presidential legal counsel John W. Dean 3d is sentenced by U.S. District Judge John J. Sirica to 1 to 4 years in prison for his role in the Watergate cover-up. He is to begin serving his term September 3.

Aug. 4—President Nixon summons top aides to Camp David for a conference.

Aug. 5—President Nixon releases the transcripts of 3 White House conversations taped on June 23, 1972, 6 days after the break-in at the Watergate, which reveal his involvement in the cover-up. In a statement accompanying the release, the President admits that 6 days after the break-in he ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation: "Don't go any further into this." He admits that he did not inform his counsel, James St. Clair, or his supporters on the House Judiciary Committee of this. In response to a Supreme Court order (See *Current History*, August, 1974, p. 96), the President has released to Judge Sirica tapes of 64 conversations (including those of June 23, 1972) and other material subpoenaed by the special Watergate prosecutor.

Charles E. Wiggins (R., Calif.), the President's strongest defender on the House Judiciary Committee, announces that he is prepared to sustain at least 1 article of impeachment against the Pres-

ident, in view of the President's admitted role in the Watergate cover-up. Wiley Mayne (R., Iowa) and Joseph Haraziti (R., N.J.), defenders of the President on the House Judiciary Committee, also announce they will vote for impeachment on the charge of obstruction of justice.

House majority leader Thomas P. O'Neil, Jr., of Massachusetts predicts that no more than 75 of the 435 Representatives would oppose impeachment.

Aug. 6—At an afternoon news conference, House minority leader John J. Rhodes says he favors impeachment because of the President's involvement in the cover-up.

Representative Trent Lott (R., Miss.) says he now favors impeachment; he is the last of the President's 10 supporters on the Judiciary Committee to reveal that he favors impeachment.

The former Republican national chairman, Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, says that the President has no more than 20 supporters in the Senate.

President Nixon informs his Cabinet and his top aides that he will not resign; he will allow the impeachment process to continue.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is cleared by a unanimous vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of charges that he lied to the committee about his part in tapping the telephones of 17 officials and reporters between 1969 and 1971.

Aug. 7—Senate minority leader Senator Hugh Scott (R., Pa.), Senator Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.), and House minority leader John J. Rhodes meet with the President.

After meeting with the President, Goldwater says he told the President that not more than 15 Senators could be expected to vote for his acquittal at this time; it was agreed that the House vote for impeachment would be "nearly unanimous."

Vice President Ford meets for an hour with General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., the President's chief of staff.

Jack Jacobson, a lawyer for the Associated Milk Producers, Inc., pleads guilty to charges that he bribed former Treasury Secretary John B. Connally.

Aug. 8—Addressing the nation on television, the President says he will resign, effective tomorrow (see *U.S., Administration*).

Aug. 9—President Richard M. Nixon resigns from office (see *U.S., Administration*).

Appearing before Judge Hart, Connally pleads not guilty to charges of accepting a bribe, perjury, and conspiring to obstruct justice.

An agreement is reached in U.S. District Court between the Democratic National Committee and the Committee for the Reelection of the President.

The Republican committee agrees to pay \$775,000 to the Democratic party, Lawrence F. O'Brien, former party chairman, and the association of state chairmen. As previously agreed, O'Brien will give his \$400,000 share to the Democratic party treasury. The Democratic committee was asking the Republican committee for \$6.4 million, accusing it of wiretapping, invasion of privacy, trespassing and conspiracy. All the charges stemmed from the Watergate break-in.

Aug. 12—Norman Sherman, former press secretary to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.), pleads guilty to charges of aiding and abetting illegal corporate donations to political campaigns made by the Associated Milk Producers, Inc.

Aug. 13—The Justice Department's antitrust suit against the Associated Milk Producers, Inc., is settled. The group is charged with violating the Sherman Antitrust Act and of putting illegal pressures on milk producers who are not members of the association. No penalties are imposed on the association, which has agreed not to practice illegal activities in the future.

Aug. 22—Federal District Judge Sirica sets a new trial date, September 30, for beginning the Watergate cover-up trial; the postponement was urged by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Chief Judge Hart orders 3 attorneys for Charles G. Rebozo, a friend of former President Nixon's, to surrender to the Watergate special prosecutor their records dealing with financing improvements at Nixon's Florida home.

Aug. 23—J. F. terHorst, President Ford's press secretary, announces that the President's legal counsel, Philip W. Buchen, has agreed that former President Nixon's aides may examine papers they left at the White House.

Aug. 29—Former President Richard Nixon is served with 2 subpoenas by a U.S. marshal. One subpoena, issued at the request of John D. Ehrlichman, former presidential adviser on domestic affairs, requires Nixon to testify at the September 30 Watergate cover-up trial. The 2d subpoena requires Nixon to appear at the September 24 trial of H. R. Haldeman, who, along with 7 others, is accused in a \$100,000 damage suit of denying the civil rights of 21 young people who were refused admittance to a Billy Graham Day rally in 1971.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina; U.S., Legislation*)

Aug. 28—Saigon government officials announce the discovery of traces of oil in a trial well drilled almost 200 miles south of the South Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea. □



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